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THE VISIBILITY VALUE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Brian C. Murchison*
At a dark moment in American politics, marked by hyperbole and insult in public
discourse, seemingly unlimited special-interest funding of candidates and agendas,
and high-speed technology disseminating messages worldwide, a concerned commen-
tator recently asked: “[D]oes anyone believe that the ‘free market-place of ideas’ is
functioning?”1 The question arose from arguments that the hallowed First Amendment
protections of speech and press often seem too narrow, yet, at the same time, too
broad.2 They are too narrow, according to the argument, because they overempha-
size “negative” liberty—freedom from state suppression or punishment of citizens’
expression—and ignore development of “positive” rights—freedom to participate
meaningfully in public debate as aided in various ways by state intervention.3 And
the same protections are said to be too broad in the sense that they apply neutrally,
and hence, universally—not just to protect individual speakers, but to protect speech
itself, regardless of source, including expression of corporations, unions, and other
artificial entities.4
Cataloguing these frustrations, commentators often fail to credit the “access”
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, a line of decisions that in important ways avoid
the above critique. Announced in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia5 in 1980,
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1 David Cole, Why Free Speech Is Not Enough, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2017, at
34 (reviewing LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMPROMISE (2016), and SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE PARADOX
OF PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA (2016)).
2 See id.
3 See id. For insightful analyses of negative and positive liberties, see David P. Currie,
Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986); Thomas I.
Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795 (1981). For a
more concise definition of negative and positive rights, see Bryan P. Wilson, Comment, State
Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism: Is the Big Sky Falling?, 53
EMORY L.J. 627, 635 (2004).
4 See Cole, supra note 1, at 34–35 (detailing criticisms of mainstream First Amendment
theory in the works of Weinrib and Lebovic). See generally Marvin Ammori, First Amend-
ment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1 (discussing overlooked First Amendment cases on
positive rights).
5 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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and developed in state and federal courts over the past thirty-eight years,6 the right
of access to government proceedings and information is not precisely a “negative”
liberty.7 Although access proponents attack official courtroom closures and official
sealing of documents, the cases characterize access rights positively—as freedom
to gather and to receive information from institutions that have duties to disclose.8
And although access rights are neutral and universal, they are almost always invoked
by citizen groups, the media, or other entities seeking to bring useful information to
the public eye and to further the accountability of those in power.9 Few would dis-
agree that First Amendment access jurisprudence has gone far in forcing U.S. insti-
tutions to unveil, for public evaluation, a host of facts and hidden practices in both
criminal and civil settings.10
In large part, the right of access is a product of Justice William Brennan’s consti-
tutional philosophy; in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence11 and other writings,12
he explained the right as a “structural” protection in the sense of relating not to expres-
sion itself but to “the structure of communications necessary for the existence of our
democracy.”13 Brennan urged attention to the “indispensable conditions of meaning-
ful communication,” those background “processes” that permit speech on matters of
public concern to be “informed.”14 Associating structural protections with what schol-
ars have argued is the “democratic participation” value of the First Amendment,15
6 See discussion infra Part III.
7 See Emerson, supra note 3, at 831.
8 Id. Discussing Richmond Newspapers, Professor Emerson notes that, in one sense, the
case “is little more than a negative-interference case, protecting the press against govern-
mental infringement upon a traditional right.” Id. However, he is quick to note that “the
Supreme Court did hold, for the first time, that the first amendment does compel the gov-
ernment to furnish some information.” Id.
9 See, e.g., Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The
Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 716, 725 (2004) (noting
various groups that supported an anti-secrecy court rule in South Carolina). See generally
Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113 (2008).
10 See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (noting a “tradition
of accessibility” with regard to criminal proceedings (citation omitted)).
11 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment).
12 See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address
at the Dedication of the S.I. Newshouse Center for Law and Justice (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32
RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979) [hereinafter Brennan, Address].
13 Id. at 176.
14 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment);
Brennan, Address, supra note 12, at 176–77.
15 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970). See
generally Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Governance Value, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1251 (2006) (discussing how free speech principles, generally, aid citizens in
self-governance).
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Brennan noted that the conditions and “processes” for disseminating news ultimately
made possible the exercise of “self-government” by citizens.16 And he was convinced
that the access cases were of pivotal importance—more important, in his estimation,
than other First Amendment cases of the period.17 For Brennan, the access cases ad-
dressed no less an issue than “the kind of government we have set for ourselves in our
Constitution,” by asking “whether that government will be visible to the people, who
are its authors.”18 The striking image of citizens as authors and the democratic state
as a creative work in progress is a key to this corner of First Amendment law. By
stressing the people’s complex project of composing both the form and content of their
civic lives, Brennan took seriously a “conception of politics” that informs the U.S.
Constitution: “[T]he people, and not the institutions of government, are sovereign.”19
To earn and maintain the confidence of citizens, Brennan saw that the courts
would need to develop a theory and practice of presumptive openness.20 Years later,
Judge Easterbrook articulated much the same idea when he wrote: “The political
branches of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step
that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing
decision look more like fiat and requires rigorous justification.”21 A “visibility value,”
then, considered as a subset of the broader self-governance value of the Speech and
Press Clauses, animates the access cases and is directly traceable to Brennan’s under-
standing of both constitutional design and the First Amendment.
Recent litigation, however, suggests that access rights are at a crossroads, facing
resistance from strong forces, public and private alike. In the past three years, high-
profile legal battles have been fought over the rationale and scope of the right to re-
ceive, as some litigants push to extend the right to new settings and others raise new
arguments in opposition.22 In cases arising in multiple stages of both civil and crim-
inal settings, federal and state courts have confronted an array of scenarios involving
questions of what can be hidden and what must be visible.23
For example, when must settlement agreements be publicly available? In a prod-
ucts liability case filed in federal court, Jain v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,24 the par-
ties engaged in pretrial skirmishes for a year, including a failed motion for summary
16 See Brennan, Address, supra note 12, at 175–77.
17 See id. at 181 (remarking that the Court’s decision rejecting access arguments in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), “justif[ied] far more concern” than a
decision of the same term denying a testimonial privilege in libel cases).
18 Id.
19 Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 376
(1976). See generally Brennan, Address, supra note 12.
20 See generally Brennan, Address, supra note 12.
21 Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006).
22 See infra notes 24–65 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 24–65 and accompanying text.
24 No. 7:13-cv-00551, 2014 WL 7330805 (W.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2014).
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judgment, and then decided to settle.25 Fearing that the presiding federal judge would
require disclosure of the settlement agreement, they obtained approval—and sealing—
of the agreement by a state judge with no prior connection to the case.26 They then
went back to federal court to dismiss the case, but the federal judge refused, con-
demning the effort to keep the settlement under wraps by conducting an “end run
around the court where the case was brought.”27 Although a state law resolved the
case in favor of disclosure, the federal judge explicitly invoked the First Amendment
as the underlying value in the controversy.28 Despite this positive conclusion, the
case exemplified the surprising ease with which open-court rules can be skirted.
In another recent civil case, a trial was almost entirely shut down from public
view, prompting questions about what order of countervailing interest can defeat a
presumption of openness.29 In Doe v. Public Citizen,30 a company sought to enjoin
a federal agency from publishing on its website a report that the company’s product
had caused the death of a child.31 Objecting to the accuracy of the report, the com-
pany claimed that its reputational concerns justified closure throughout the litigation.32
The trial judge agreed.33 Not only did the judge seal his own summary judgment
decision, but he closed the trial itself, sealed other documents in the case, and struck
any mention of the trial in the court’s docketing sheets.34 The judge’s apparent basis
was a federal law that permitted companies to challenge inaccurate postings on an
agency website.35 In a strong decision to reverse, a panel of the Fourth Circuit laid
down what seemed an obvious rule: “When parties ‘call on the courts, they must ac-
cept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly
accountable) officials.’”36 Despite the shocking near-total closure in the case, a con-
curring judge comforted the trial judge for having his “heart . . . in the right place”
by worrying about the company’s “survival” “[i]n the electronically viral world that
we live in today.”37 The concurring judge also regretted that the author of the Fourth
25 See generally id.; Order at 1, Jain, No. 7:13-cv-00551.
26 Order, supra note 25, at 1.
27 Id. at 3–4.
28 See id. at 3 & n.2.
29 Cf. Scott Michelman, Fourth Circuit Vindicates First Amendment Right to Access
Court Proceedings, Rejects Secret Litigation, ACLU VA. (Apr. 19, 2014), https://acluva.org
/en/news/fourth-circuit-vindicates-first-amendment-right-access-court-proceedings-rejects
-secret [https://perma.cc/T5TS-VWSW].
30 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014).
31 Id. at 252.
32 See id. at 254.
33 Id. at 255 (stating that the lower court “concluded that the Commission’s decision to
publish the report of harm was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion”).
34 Id. at 254–56.
35 See id. at 253–55.
36 Id. at 271 (quoting Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000)).
37 Id. at 276 (Hamilton, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Circuit’s decision had not acknowledged “the difficult task confronted by the district
court” when the decisions to close were made.38 The comments suggested that the
panel was far from unanimous in assessing the strength of access rights.
A third civil case dealt not with efforts of parties to hide settlements or decisions
of a trial court to close a courtroom, but with a state statute mandating closed court-
rooms for an entire set of business disputes arbitrated by sitting judges.39 In Delaware
Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine,40 legislation designed to attract busi-
nesses to incorporate in Delaware authorized expeditious arbitrations of business dis-
putes worth at least one million dollars by Court of Chancery judges.41 The problem
was that the legislation mandated that all such arbitrations be closed to the press and
public—not even a shareholder could attend, much less a reporter or an interested
citizen.42 After a trial judge declared the statute to be a violation of the First Amend-
ment right of access,43 a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed, citing access decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, all of which had arisen
in the criminal law setting, and decisions of the lower courts, many of which had ex-
tended the right to civil contexts.44 But the panel was split 2–1, with each of the three
judges writing an opinion and signaling considerable uncertainty about the applicable
legal doctrine.45 The decision then drew a published rebuke from Myron T. Steele,
the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware, who, now in private
practice,46 declared that the Supreme Court’s access cases were inapplicable, that the
panel had “overly broadened” the right of access, and that the effect would be to
“stifle[ ] state innovation and misalign[ ] the constitutional pendulum.”47 A petition
for certiorari was filed by the Chancery Judges, and numerous business attorneys and
entities urged the Supreme Court to take the case, clarify the relevant doctrine, and
reverse.48 The petition was denied,49 but the fracas signaled considerable tension
38 Id.
39 See generally Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
40 733 F. 3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
41 See id. at 512.
42 See id. at 513.
43 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012).
44 See Strine, 733 F.3d at 513–16, 518–19, 521.
45 See id. at 512, 521, 523.
46 An Interview with Former Chief Justice Myron Steele, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2014, at
1, https://americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/09/member_spotlight.html [https://perma.cc
/6BGM-M2EB].
47 Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning the Constitutional Pendulum, 77 ALB.
L. REV. 1365, 1383 (2014).
48 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1551 (2014) (No. 13-869). For an example of pro-business groups’ support for a grant of cer-
tiorari, see Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and Business
Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (No. 13-869).
49 Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551.
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about the definition and strength of the visibility value of the First Amendment in
a fairly novel setting.
In another recent civil case, limits on access rights were front and center. Citing
the First Amendment, the American Civil Liberties Union moved to have the U.S. For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court unseal previously redacted material in the Court’s
opinions on the legal basis for bulk collection of data by the federal government.50
In a 42-page decision, the court rejected the First Amendment arguments, but on an
unexpected basis: that the ACLU lacked standing to bring the suit.51 The court ex-
plained that it considered the access arguments “only as part of the assessment of
whether the [ACLU] has standing under Article III.”52 The ACLU lacked standing
because the requested material had been redacted by, and was completely within the
control of, the Executive Branch.53 The access arguments, then, fell flat, with the court
suggesting (not very persuasively) that Executive Branch classifications could be
subject to FOIA requests rather than access petitions under the First Amendment.54
Two other hard-fought, recent controversies arose in the context of criminal prose-
cutions. The cases demonstrated the persistence of access issues despite the greater
clarity of case law in the criminal setting. The first, In re The Wall Street Journal,55
arose from a coal mine owner’s indictment on federal charges following a 2010
mine explosion that killed 29 people.56 The day after the indictment, a federal trial
judge, without making findings of necessity, issued a sweeping gag order prohibit-
ing public access to most documents filed in the case, and forbidding the parties,
their counsel, potential trial participants, and court personnel from discussing the case
with the media.57 This order remained in place for three months, when it was finally
50 In re Ops. & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08, 2017 WL 427591 (FISA Ct. Jan. 25,
2017), vacated en banc, No. Misc. 13-08, 2017 WL 5983865 (FISA Ct. Nov. 9, 2017).
51 See id. at *21 (finding that “[b]ecause the First Amendment qualified right of access
does not apply to the FISC proceedings at issue in this matter, the Movants have no legally
protected interest” and lack standing). The Court also noted that only one other case involved
an issue of third-party standing in a First Amendment–related claim. Id. at *5.
52 Id. at *21 n.17.
53 See id. at *1.
54 See id. at *19.
55 601 F. App’x 215 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
56 See id. at 217; United States v. Blankenship, 79 F. Supp. 3d 613, 618 (S.D.W. Va.
2015) (noting that “[m]any of our families depend on coal mining for their livelihood,” and
“[m]any families and communities within the Southern District of this state were impacted
by the deaths of the miners in the Upper Big Branch mine explosion referenced in the
indictment”), vacated sub nom. In re The Wall Street Journal, 601 F. App’x 215; see also
David E. Armendariz et al., Recent Developments in Media, Privacy, Defamation, and Ad-
vertising Law, 51 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 543, 559 (2016); Alan Blinder, Donald
Blankenship Sentenced to a Year in Prison in Mine Safety Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/2jEppRu.
57 See In re The Wall Street Journal, 601 F. App’x at 217 & n* (reproducing the gag order).
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vacated by a panel of the Fourth Circuit in a per curiam decision.58 The brevity of the
panel’s analysis could well be seen as a strong rebuke of the lower court’s decision,
but the fact remains that a three-month silence had been achieved by the unconstitu-
tional order.59
In a second widely noted criminal case, federal prosecutors brought charges
against HSBC Bank, alleging that the bank helped criminal drug cartels launder
profits, among much else.60 The bank and the government subsequently entered into
a five-year Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), which included appointment
of a corporate compliance monitor and a limited supervisory role for the presiding
federal judge.61 When the monitor issued his first report, the government filed it under
seal.62 Ruling on a motion to unseal, the federal judge agreed that the report should
be disclosed, despite the objections from both the bank and the prosecutors.63 Citing
the First Amendment access cases, the trial judge stood by his decision to unseal.64
On appeal to the Second Circuit, numerous amici urged the court to affirm the report’s
unsealing as a “judicial record” open to inspection under the First Amendment, but
an appellate panel reversed, and the report remains entirely off limits.65
As these cases suggest, access law has been marred by uncertainty, not only about
its underlying philosophy, but also about its doctrinal content and breadth. Part I of
this Article revisits the Supreme Court’s debates concerning the right to receive, and
argues that Justice Brennan’s intellectual contribution has been central.66 As discussed
below, Brennan and Chief Justice Burger engaged in a curious debate in Richmond
Newspapers.67 Writing for the plurality, the Chief Justice envisioned access (at least
in part) as a communal interest in channeling anxiety about threats to social order.68
58 Id. at 217–19.
59 The gag order was issued on January 7, 2015, and was not vacated until March 5, 2015.
See id. at 215, 219.
60 See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at
*1, *8–9 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
61 See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (JG), 2016 WL 347670,
a *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (finding that Corporate Monitor’s Report is a judicial record
and that the public has a First Amendment right of access to the Report).
62 Id. at *2.
63 See id. at *6–7 (holding that both parties’ interests can be achieved through targeted
redactions).
64 See id. at *4–7.
65 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press &
24 News Media Organizations in Support of Appellee at 1–2, United States v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-308); see also Peter J. Henning, HSBC
Case Tests Transparency of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/2mq5uV6. See generally HSBC Bank USA, 863 F.3d 125 (holding that the
DPA was not a “judicial document” subject to presumptive public access).
66 See discussion infra Part I.
67 See 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see discussion infra Section I.E.
68 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he open processes
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Burger supported the law’s interest in peaceful problem-solving, admired the genius
of openness in Anglo-American tradition, and hoped it would meet the culture’s ther-
apeutic needs.69 Brennan, on the other hand, emphasized the structural role of access
in the design of the federal government and its contribution to the formation of demo-
cratic character.70 As we shall see, he was particularly interested in the role of access
in encouraging the internalization of values relating to procedural fairness.71
Part II then posits that, in the wake of the foundational Supreme Court cases,
which ultimately adopted the Brennan approach, the courts of appeals took charge
of doctrinal development.72 In particular, appellate courts experimented with ana-
logical reasoning in cases involving proceedings that lacked a long historical record
of openness but bore some resemblance to proceedings that did claim a relevant
background.73 Arguments over analogy might have taken over the intellectual dynamic
as the case law developed, except that the arguments too often broke off in doubt.74
As a result, access cases depended for resolution more often on functional arguments
about the advantages and disadvantages of openness in different contexts.75 At the
heart of these discussions was an emphasis traceable to Justice Brennan and to the
premium he placed on preserving the public’s confidence in the judicial branch and
exposing citizens to the legal values observable in open proceedings.76
Part III then discusses a third tier in the creation of access jurisprudence: the trial
judges.77 As they have implemented the Supreme Court’s philosophical premises
and applied the methodologies of appellate courts, trial judges have left their own
distinctive marks. For at least some of them, the educative function of access has
been paramount.78 These judges are closest to the ground, nearest to the population,
and they recognize the capacity of access jurisprudence to communicate some of the
law’s richest values.79 In three difficult access cases, the Article follows trial judges
as they invoke openness to illuminate ideas of due process.80 One judge reins in at-
torneys seeking to avoid a law that would force sensitive information into the light;81
of justice serve as an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility, and emotion.”).
69 See id. at 564–80.
70 See id. at 584–98 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
71 See id.; discussion infra Section I.E.
72 See discussion infra Part II.
73 See discussion infra Part II.
74 See discussion infra Part II.
75 See discussion infra Part II.
76 See discussion infra Part II.
77 See discussion infra Part III.
78 See discussion infra Part III.
79 See discussion infra Part III.
80 See discussion infra Part III.
81 See discussion infra Section III.A.
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another forbids corporate antagonists from attempting to “own” a lawsuit by redacting
the information flow;82 and a third insists on openness as a way of keeping the Depart-
ment of Justice honest in its arrangement with a targeted corporation.83 In each, rules
of openness allow judges to maintain their courtrooms as public places and to
strengthen their relationships of trust with the community.84 In the end, it is the trial
judges who foster the relationship between courts and citizenry that Justice Brennan
first conceived for the law of access.85 In a troubled time for public institutions gen-
erally, perhaps it will be trial judges whose example reawakens the visibility value.
I. ARTICULATING THE RELATIONSHIP: COURT AND CITIZEN IN ACCESS CASES
The generative documents in the access cases are two opinions by Justice
Brennan—his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers86 and his majority opinion in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.87 In both, he suggested philosophical
underpinnings of a right of access to criminal proceedings, and he defined a doc-
trinal framework.88 The disarray in today’s access jurisprudence may be due to raw
neglect of the contours and implications of the Brennan legacy.
Brennan’s earlier writings had laid the groundwork for an approach to informa-
tional access; in talks before audiences of law students and the practicing bar, he
addressed seemingly disparate topics that he would later connect, producing a dis-
tinctive vision of free speech informed by access to information.89 The topics con-
cerned the relationship of citizen to government.90 Although he took seriously the
formal constitutional theory of a principal-agent relationship between citizens and
the branches of government, he took just as seriously the insights of a “sociological
jurisprudence” that probed the reality of social conditions and the “actuality of the
individual human beings who constitute society in fact.”91 Combining respect for
82 See discussion infra Section III.B.
83 See discussion infra Section III.C.
84 See discussion infra Part III.
85 See discussion infra Part III.
86 448 U.S. 555, 584–98 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
87 457 U.S. 596, 597–611 (1982).
88 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604–06; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586–88
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
89 See, e.g., Brennan, Address, supra note 12, at 174–77 (discussing the impact First
Amendment Court decisions have on the press and social interests).
90 See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, Alexander
Meiklejohn Lecture at Brown University (Apr. 14, 1965), in 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965)
[hereinafter Brennan, Meiklejohn Interpretation] (discussing differing theories of the First
Amendment’s scope in relation to conflicting desires of citizens and government).
91 William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Centennial Address at the
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formal structure with clear-eyed attention to present-day conditions, Brennan’s focus
was the content of values, their place in legal thought, and their creation through a
complex process of debate and education.
A. Sovereignty and Structure
A primary strand of Justice Brennan’s thought—part of a web of considerations
that arguably underlay his opinions on access92—was a structural conception of
sovereignty lodged in “the people.”93 But who were “the people?” Speculating on
Brennan’s formative experiences, his biographers cite his father’s union organizing
in Newark, New Jersey.94 “What got me interested in people’s rights and liberties,”
Brennan later said, “was the kind of family and the kind of neighborhood I was
brought up in. I saw all kinds of suffering—people had to struggle.”95 He came of
age in the era of Lochner’s “spirit of hostility to social change,”96 the period in which
“the industrial system [was put] on trial” in the federal prosecution of members of
the Industrial Workers of the World for sedition.97 His structural conception was there-
fore grounded, at least partially, in labor controversies of the early twentieth century
and was anything but abstract. Later, as a young justice of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, he was attentive to issues in the criminal justice system and dissented memora-
bly from a decision of the Chief Justice that upheld the state’s denial of a criminal de-
fendant’s request to review his own confession before trial.98 “We must remember,”
Brennan wrote in the case,
Centennial Convocation of the George Washington Law School (Oct. 12, 1965), in 34 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 189, 190 (1965) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Brennan, Centennial Address].
92 Cf. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 84–85 (3d ed. 2010) (commenting on
Brennan’s judicial style and noting that, in his majority opinion for the Supreme Court in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Justice “did not rest his malice test on any
single constitutional foundation” but “built a web supporting his legal test from many sides”).
93 William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Worldwide Influence
of the United States Constitution as a Charter of Human Rights, Speech at the Columbia Law
School Bicentennial Celebration (Nov. 20, 1987), in 15 NOVA L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1991) [herein-
after Brennan, Worldwide Influence].
94 See Nat Hentoff, The Constitutionalist, NEW YORKER (Mar. 12, 1990), https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/1990/03/12/the-constitutionalist [https://perma.cc/9JLA-MVYJ].
95 Id. Brennan himself did not suffer the poverty that would later figure into Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), but his opinion for the Court in that case “comported with the
economic worldview of Brennan’s father, what Brennan himself had seen in Depression-era
Newark, and the importance he placed on protecting people’s human dignity.” SETH STERN
& STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 342 (2010).
96 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 104 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
6th ed. 2016).
97 LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COM-
PROMISE 83 (2016).
98 State v. Tune, 96 A.2d 881, 894–98 (N.J. 1953) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that society’s interest is equally that the innocent shall not suffer
and not alone that the guilty shall not escape.
. . . .
. . . It shocks my sense of justice that . . . counsel for an ac-
cused facing a possible death sentence should be denied inspec-
tion of his confession which, were this a civil case, could not be
denied.99
The same blend of eloquence and realism could be heard in his much later refer-
ences to citizens, not as cogs in a machinelike apparatus of government, but as
“authors” of constitutional life, “well-springs” of a republic possessing a “revolu-
tionary character”—assignors of duties to three distinct units of government.100 This
was a description of “the people” as descendants and implementers of the Enlighten-
ment, whose mission was to define a new conception of “the relationship of the indi-
vidual and the state.”101 And for Brennan, the people’s own “choice of democratic
self-governance” in the Constitution was an early manifestation of a “vision of the
supremacy of the human dignity of every individual.”102
In the relationship between citizen and state, “the people” were more than origi-
nators of authority; Brennan saw them as engaged overseers of the actions of their
agents, possessing the power of the vote to control government actors, as well as the
power of speech to influence and hold those actors to account.103 Besides providing
for executive, legislative, and judicial agents of the people, the Constitution provided
for an institution that would serve as surrogate—the press—and be instrumental in en-
forcing accountability of each institution of government.104 But Brennan recognized—
and embraced—the fact that the constitutional design was even more complex in its
99 Id. at 895–96.
100 Brennan, Address, supra note 12, at 181 (referring to “the people” as “authors”); id.
at 192 (referring to individuals as “well-springs”); Brennan, Worldwide Influence, supra note
93, at 2 (describing the Constitution’s “revolutionary character”).
101 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 230, 235 (David M. O’Brien
ed., 5th ed. 2017) [hereinafter Brennan, The Constitution].
102 Id. at 236.
103 See Brennan, Meiklejohn Interpretation, supra note 90, at 11, 14–15 (discussing New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and the influence of Alexander Meiklejohn,
who believed “the people created a form of government” based on a “basic decision . . . to
govern themselves rather than to be governed by others,” and James Madison, who stated
“that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government
over the people” (citation omitted)).
104 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 592–93 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment) (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975),
for its recognition of “the function of the press” in facilitating public awareness of the ad-
ministration of justice).
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ambition; the people’s surrogate, in turn, would be aided by the federal courts, which
would work to guarantee the rights of citizens and surrogates alike.105 Thus, one of the
primary duties of the federal courts was to safeguard the ability of all to engage in
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” expression about the significant issues of the
day.106 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan107 embodied the idea that the “central mean-
ing of the First Amendment” was to facilitate the power to evaluate and, if necessary,
strongly criticize the exercise of governmental power.108
But in order to perform this essential safeguarding role, the courts themselves
had to be structurally independent, free of political control by the other branches.109
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that Brennan was something of a separa-
tion of powers purist, at least in cases in which he feared that the political branches
had enacted laws undermining the independence of the federal judiciary. Thus, in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.110 and in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,111 he voted to strike down statutes that, in
his view, diluted the power of the federal courts in certain adjudicatory contexts.112
His concern was that the statutes in question deprived citizens of protection from
“majoritarian pressures”—essentially that erosion of Article III courts, even if in-
cremental and well-intentioned, could not be tolerated.113 As a principle of order,
constitutional design was paramount; Brennan held true to structure, even the
eighteenth-century design that permeated the rhetoric of separation of powers, for
a simple reason: individual liberty depended on a strong, even fearless, judiciary.114
In the face of mocking criticism from fellow Justices, who castigated Brennan for his
“inexplicably heavy hand” and for “grossly” oversimplifying the meaning of the
Constitution,115 Brennan maintained a belief in the importance of fidelity to sepa-
rated powers and judicial review.116
105 Cf. id. at 592–97.
106 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
107 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
108 Id. at 273.
109 See generally, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
859–67 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
110 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
111 478 U.S. 833, 859–67 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 See generally, e.g., id. at 859; N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87–89 (plurality
opinion).
113 Schor, 478 U.S. at 859–60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 See id. at 867 (“It is our obligation zealously to guard [judicial] independence so that
our tripartite system of government remains strong and that individuals continue to be pro-
tected against decisionmakers subject to majoritarian pressures. Unfortunately, today the Court
forsakes that obligation for expediency.”).
115 N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 95, 103 (White, J., dissenting).
116 See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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B. Sociological Jurisprudence
The other Justices’ criticism might have stuck if Justice Brennan’s structural con-
cerns had been the sum total of his outlook, but they were not. Brennan’s thought
was capacious enough not only to capture the dynamic of constitutional design, but
also to bring searching eyes to the pressing cultural, racial, and geopolitical struggles
of the nation in the mid-1960s—real struggles within the structure of the state.117
Along with his appreciation for constitutional design was a similarly vital sense of
what he called (in 1965) a “new jurisprudence” that incorporated the strides of legal
realism but sought to move “further still,” beyond an emphasis on “property and
power priorities of society,” and towards a focus on human experience.118 This juris-
prudence prompted an entirely new set of questions. Brennan approvingly cited ques-
tions posed by an ABA Report on Comparative Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy:
“[W]hat is the nature of man, and what is the nature of the universe with which he is
confronted. . . . Why is a human being important; what gives him dignity; what limits
his freedom to do whatever he likes; what are his essential needs; whence comes his
sense of injustice?”119
As Mark Greif masterfully describes in a recent book,120 these questions were
pervasive in American culture at mid-twentieth century, precisely the time Brennan
raised them himself.121 As Greif states: “For a long period in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, fundamental anthropology—the problematic nature of ‘man’—became a main
rhetorical and contemplative current in the streams of thought and writing that shape
a public philosophy.”122 Greif’s book helps to situate Brennan in a particular time and
place. With the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe, and the advent and massive ex-
perience of World War II, the pre-1930s pragmatism and progressivism of John Dewey
seemed incapable of addressing a mid-century “perception of danger” that liberalism
and capitalism were under “civilizational threat” and that humanist thought about the
nature of man was obsolete.123 In works of art, theology, literary criticism, anthropol-
ogy, fiction, and philosophy, a range of thinkers “asked what man was, in what part
of himself he should have a steady faith, and how he had come to this pass.”124
Greif explores the range of answers that were offered by philosophers, novelists,
and many others; many kept the focus on “the self” and “man” and explored the idea
117 Cf. Brennan, Centennial Address, supra note 91, at 190–91.
118 See id.
119 Id. at 191 (quoting ABA, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 195, 198–99 (1964)).
120 MARK GREIF, THE AGE OF THE CRISIS OF MAN: THOUGHT AND FICTION IN AMERICA
1933–1973 (2015).
121 See id. at xi; see also Brennan, Centennial Address, supra note 91, at 191.
122 GREIF, supra note 120, at xi.
123 See id. at x, 3, 54.
124 Id. at 7.
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of a universal human nature, referencing a vision of man, drawn from the Enlighten-
ment, as a “spiritual guardian and rational proprietor of our planet.”125 This was the
model of human beings as “choosing and loving and suffering and growing.”126 Was
this model of humanity descriptively accurate, and were its concerns relevant? The
humanists insisted yes.127 For others, though, especially the critical theorists of the
late 1950s and 1960s, this perspective on the self and its processes of growth was
outmoded and wrong.128 The anti-humanists flatly rejected the notion of a common
essence or foundation, insisting that, among other limitations, the discourse of “man”
glaringly omitted concerns for outliers, particularly minorities and women, and ne-
glected the possibility that “appeals to universal brotherhood were often a screen for
white privilege.”129 The Enlightenment itself was problematic; its “impulse to lib-
eration” had “invariably bec[o]me the means of domination.”130 More deeply, the
anti-humanists rejected the idea that “individual consciousness” held the key to “its
own behavior, social practices, and beliefs.”131 Their preferred mode of thought was
“[s]ociety-level analysis,” with its focus on institutions and structure.132 Meanwhile,
novelists like Ralph Ellison and Saul Bellow took a third path, producing fictions
that traced the progress of characters toward individuality without worrying about
universals and without denying the reality of the person.133
Because Greif’s book does not delve into legal thought, he offers no analysis
of jurists or the “sociological jurisprudence” that was clearly part of the “crisis of
man” conversation in the latter part of the twentieth century.134 But if he had looked
at legal figures, Greif likely would have recognized Justice Brennan as drawing
on all three strands of the thought he identifies: the Enlightenment focus on hu-
man rationality and choice; the concern about domination by unresponsive insti-
tutions; and the persistence of belief in the possibility of individuals finding their
own meaning and character.135 These were all elements of Brennan’s sociological
125 Brian Dillon, The Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 1933–
1973 by Mark Greif—Review, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2015, 11:02 EDT), https://www
.theguardian.com/books/2015/aug/21/age-of-crisis-of-man-mark-greif-review [https://perma
.cc/RMS7-M2FE] (reviewing Greif’s book).
126 Anthony Domestico, The Age of the Crisis of the Man: Thought and Fiction in
America, 1933–1973, COMMONWEAL (June 1, 2015), https://www.commonwealmagazine
.org/age-crisis-man [https://perma.cc/QQW2-UWE4] (reviewing GREIF, supra note 120).
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 GREIF, supra note 120, at 59.
131 Id. at 286.
132 Id. at 303.
133 See generally id. at 145–203 (discussing the works of Ellison and Bellow).
134 See generally id.
135 Compare supra notes 89–116 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan’s
constitutional philosophy), with supra notes 120–33 (outlining the modes of philosophical
thought that Greif discusses in his book).
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jurisprudence.136 As noted above, Justice Brennan, using humanist vocabulary, en-
gaged the period’s questions about man and his fate; he did not shy away from identi-
fying an essence that he considered universal.137 This was human dignity, the constant
theme of his out-of-court speeches and the cited concern in many of his later judicial
opinions.138 For Brennan, dignity was a term that captured the irreducible “worth
and respect due each individual.”139 As early as 1961, he called it the “supreme value
of our American democracy.”140 Biographers speculate that his identification with
the phrase “human dignity” was traceable to Catholic social thought, or the possible
influence of a fellow Irish-American Justice, Frank Murphy, who used the terminology
in several cases, including his dissent in Korematsu v. United States,141 condemning
the subjugation of an entire population as a sure way to “destroy the dignity of the
individual.”142 Others point to the thought of Alexander Meiklejohn, whose work on
freedom of expression extolled “the dignity of a governing citizen.”143 Twenty years
after the New York Times Co. case, Brennan himself drew a connection between dig-
nity and the First Amendment, stating that “[r]ecognition of broad and deep rights
of expression and conscience reaffirm the vision of human dignity” by facilitating
public discussion and encouraging development of political ideas.144
Dignity was also connected to Brennan’s concern for social power and the modern
state’s capacity and effort “to control the understanding of the present.”145 Brennan
136 See, e.g., supra notes 89–116 and accompanying text. For additional perspectives on
Brennan’s approach to judging, see DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF WILLIAM J.
BRENNAN, JR.: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” (1997), and Ruggero J.
Aldisert, The Brennan Legacy: The Art of Judging, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 673 (1999). For a
discussion of the role in decision-making of a judge’s “tacit underlying assumptions of legal
culture,” see Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and
the People’s Elusive Right to Know, 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 67 (2012).
137 See supra notes 89–116 and accompanying text.
138 See generally Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of
Justice Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223 (1998).
139 William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Reason, Passion, and
“The Progress of the Law,” Forty-Second Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture (Sept. 17,
1987), in 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 17 (1988) [hereinafter Brennan, Reason, Passion].
140 See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 95, at 418 (quoting a speech by Brennan entitled
“The Essential Dignity of Man”).
141 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
142 Id. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 95, at 418–19
(referencing Korematsu and the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II).
143 Brian C. Murchison, Revisiting the American Action for Public Disclosure of Private
Facts, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVES 32, 41 (Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds., 2006) (citation omitted).
144 Id. at 41–42 (citation omitted).
145 David Bromwich, Literature and Theory: Notes on the Research Programs of the
1980s, in THEORY’S EMPIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF DISSENT 590, 602 (Daphne Patai & Will
H. Corral eds., 2005).
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discussed the threat posed by governmental institutions as crucially affecting, yet
ignoring the lives of, citizens.146 Like the anti-humanists profiled by Greif—theore-
ticians of structure who condemned what they saw as the complacency of humanists
with their fixity on “man” rather than “the system”147—Brennan noted the dehuman-
izing potential of state power.148 The difference was that as a Justice of the Supreme
Court, he could do something to effectuate change, even if incremental or temporary.
Thus, in a momentous 1965 decision, Dombrowski v. Pfister,149 Brennan wrote for
the Court in allowing civil rights workers who had been indicted under a Louisiana
criminal law aimed at “subversive activities” to seek injunctive relief from state prose-
cution and possible prosecution in federal court.150 The decision required a “dramatic
and profound” departure from “the established legal order”151—a federal statute for-
bade such interference with most state enforcement actions—and became a “source
of conscience” in later civil rights initiatives.152 A dissent accurately pointed out that
Brennan’s majority decision was animated by an understanding “that state courts
will not be as prone as federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly and
effectively.”153 As Brennan was later to write, human dignity necessitates the “constant
vigilance” of courts when government activity collides with individual rights.154 But
matters of racial harassment and discrimination in the civil rights era were hardly the
sole issues that required a “sociological jurisprudence”; other issues did as well, par-
ticularly those arising in the federal bureaucracy.155 Brennan was particularly con-
cerned about the “impersonal form” of administrative justice and the potential for
arbitrary action.156 In describing the federal bureaucracy, he decried “the ability of
bureaucracy to hide responsibility,” and he cited works of Max Weber expressing
concern about the power of institutions to dehumanize social welfare programs.157
Thus, in writing for the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly,158 he reasoned that welfare recip-
ients were owed personalized procedures by public officials before benefits providing
146 See generally, e.g., Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 139.
147 GREIF, supra note 120, at 285–86.
148 See generally, e.g., Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 139.
149 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
150 Id. at 481–92.
151 Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L. J. 1103, 1103 (1977).
152 Id. at 1108–10, 1164. The impact of Dombrowski was short-lived. In the 1970s and
1980s, “opinions by Brennan that helped make federal courts the primary forum for pro-
tecting federal rights, were deprived of all operative significance” by subsequent decisions.
OWEN FISS, PILLARS OF JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION 40 (2017).
153 See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 95, at 228 (quoting Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 499
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
154 Brennan, The Constitution, supra note 101, at 237.
155 See Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 139, at 18–19.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 19.
158 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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basic sustenance could be terminated.159 He explicitly cited “the Nation’s basic com-
mitment . . . to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.”160
Justice Brennan stood with the novelists of a “third way” examined by Greif as
well. For Ellison and Bellow, the ultimate focus was not on universal components
of mankind or on systemic dominance, but on the dealings of individuals with “the
sheer contingency of individual existence,”161 experiences arising from a web of re-
lations, and the capacity of persons to overcome narratives imposed on them by others
and construct their own accounts of their place in the world.162 As Ellison wrote in
Invisible Man, the self seeks to create “the uncreated features of his face.”163
Brennan recognized the value of focusing on specific facts that provoked individuals
to seek redress in the courts.164 The plaintiffs in Dombrowski and Goldberg were not
simply representatives of “man,” nor were they simply victims of a state power or of
a bureaucratic leveling process; they were persons with unique histories and claims.
For example, in Goldberg, Brennan spoke of two by name,165 and later in Mathews
v. Eldridge166 he detailed the predicament of a named disability benefits recipient.167
In sum, if Greif is right that mid-century anxieties were expressed in distinct
voices from starkly varying perspectives, Brennan displayed an acute awareness of
that multiplicity and an ability to appreciate the truth that each possessed.
C. Value Awareness: Worrying and Thinking
So far, we have examined Justice Brennan’s emphasis on (a) constitutional
structure as capturing the core function of citizens as “authors” of governance, and
(b) sociological jurisprudence as based on actual conditions affecting the dignity of
citizens. A further element of his thought, comparably important, completes the pic-
ture: the imperative of citizen awareness of the values animating American law. For
Brennan, the legal order and its pursuit of justice were not simply functions of good
159 Id. at 263–64.
160 Id. at 264–65.
161 See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 26 (1989).
162 GREIF, supra note 120, at 149, 161, 177 (Ellison’s novel, addressing the meaning of
“humanity,” insists “on the priority of distinct and individual persons, before any group
consciousness or its greater manifestation, a ‘culture’”); cf. Richard Rorty, Freud and Moral
Reflection, in PRAGMATISM’S FREUD: THE MORAL DISPOSITION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 1, 19
(Joseph H. Smith & William Kerrigan eds., 1986) (defining Freud’s concept of dignity as
“the ability of each of us to tailor a coherent self-image for ourselves and then use it to tinker
with our behavior”).
163 RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 268 (1952) (emphasis removed).
164 See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263–65.
165 Id. at 256 n.2.
166 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
167 Id. at 349–50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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judging; they were also functions of informed citizenship.168 In a speech in late
1964, against the backdrop of the Kennedy assassination and a summer of “extreme
tensions in human affairs”—including “riots in Harlem, Rochester, Dixmoor, [and]
North Philadelphia”—the Justice argued that the post-war United States had under-
gone a “serious fundamental change in . . . intellectual outlook,” but that citizens’
knowledge of the content of American values had lagged far behind.169 Speaking spe-
cifically of young people but implying a more general critique of American culture,
Brennan stated that the country was suffering from “gaps, perhaps tragic gaps” in
students’ knowledge of the meaning of the Bill of Rights and consequently in their
“respect” for constitutional principles.170 He posed the possibility that “those institu-
tions whose task it is to inculcate values have somehow failed,” and he suggested that
the problem was sufficiently serious to warrant reformulation of “the basic objectives
of liberal education.”171 He then went deeper, suggesting that citizens must grasp
both the “rights and responsibilities” contemplated by the Bill of Rights—not simply
a self-congratulatory list of such rights, but an understanding of “the conflicts in
values that often make the Bill of Rights much harder to apply than to recite.”172
U.S. society was committed, he said, “to the constitutional idea of libertarian dignity
protected through law,” and its people, particularly but not exclusively its young
people, should be part of civic “worrying and thinking about the values and interests
at stake” in difficult cases.173 In a different speech from the same period, addressing
legal education, Brennan stated that one objective of legal education should be “a
greater recognition of the place of human dignity,” with the clear implication that
“human dignity” itself had a complexity that would require additional worry and
additional thought.174
These addresses show the Justice’s concern with actively encouraging and fa-
cilitating public awareness of U.S. law and its underlying values, and more spe-
cifically, an understanding of the complexity involved in determining the proper
resolution of a hard case.175 For Brennan, the citizen’s authorship of governance was
more than conceptual, and sociological jurisprudence involved more than guarantees
of negative liberty.176 Citizens must witness values in action, including values in
168 See generally, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Comment, Education and the Bill of
Rights, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 219 (1964) [hereinafter Brennan, Education].
169 Id. at 219–22.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 221.
172 Id. at 221–22.
173 Id. at 223–24; cf. SCOTT BUCHANAN, SO REASON CAN RULE: REFLECTIONS ON LAW
AND POLITICS 20–21 (1982) (positing that “self-government is a self-educative process,” that
political thought benefits from acknowledging that “the laws are the teachers,” and that “the
making, obeying, and remaking of law is the essence of collective self-education”).
174 See Brennan, Centennial Address, supra note 91, at 194.
175 See, e.g., Brennan, Education, supra note 168, at 223.
176 See discussion supra Sections I.A–B.
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conflict.177 Citizens must evaluate how values function and compete, and they must
assess what values can and do achieve.178 Inculcation, if it happens, can only happen
through such a process.179
D. The Road to Richmond Newspapers
Recognition of a First Amendment–based right of access occurred after four
false starts—press defeats in Branzburg v. Hayes,180 Pell v. Procunier,181 Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.,182 and Houchins v. KQED, Inc.183 The underlying question in
those cases was whether the First Amendment provided significant protection for
newsgathering, and the Supreme Court offered no clear answer.184 The Court had
already established strong protections for publication itself,185 but the prepublication
process of acquiring information was unknown territory.
Was newsgathering best considered tangential to publication in First Amendment
theory, or was it an integral part of a speech dynamic that required strong judicial
vigilance? As the Court struggled to conceptualize access and to define a framework,
it was distracted by two initial problems. One was whether newsgathering protections
(if any) involved “positive rights,” which some of the Justices would find to be a
stumbling block.186 If that issue could be resolved in favor of the press, a second
problem involved identifying the source of access rights to a specific venue: criminal
proceedings.187 Would any such rights derive from the Public Trial guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment or from the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment?
The Court’s struggles with these queries caused frustrating delays on the road
to Richmond Newspapers. However, although four preliminary cases were losses for
the press, they yielded a few small but important benefits. They clearly introduced
the topic of press access, familiarized the Justices with values associated with news-
gathering—particularly the educative effect of access—and drew from the Justices
a statement that, although it seemed at first no more than a grudging concession, was
177 See discussion supra Sections I.A–B.
178 See discussion supra Sections I.A–B.
179 See discussion supra Sections I.A–B.
180 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
181 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
182 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
183 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
184 See, e.g., Houchins, 438 U.S. at 7–12 (plurality opinion) (discussing the Court’s case
law and indicating there is a limited press right to a public trial).
185 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (ruling that
the New York Times and Washington Post could publish classified government documents).
186 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584–98 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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a seed from which much would grow: that journalists’ pursuit of news was “not
without its First Amendment protections.”188
Branzburg v. Hayes, argued in early 1972, had the bad luck of poor timing.189
The mainstream press had won a landmark decision just eight months before, when
the Supreme Court invalidated injunctions ordering the New York Times and other
newspapers not to publish the Pentagon Papers.190 And less than a decade earlier, the
press had won New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,191 which rewrote the libel tort in
cases brought by public officials against critics of their official behavior.192 A num-
ber of cases in the wake of Sullivan had continued the redefinition of libel.193 By the
time of Branzburg, retrenchment may have begun, as a number of the Justices balked
at embarking on another major project related to the press.194 To be sure, the issue
in Branzburg was complex, involving not a direct restriction on publication, but an
impediment to information gathering.195 The question was whether the First Amend-
ment guaranteed journalists a privilege “not to respond to [grand jury] questions
about criminal activity they had witnessed, notwithstanding that a pledge of confi-
dentiality had been given by the journalists to their sources.”196 The case reviewed
judgments from several jurisdictions, all involving reporters who had conducted in-
vestigative journalism about timely topics, including drug use and radical political
action.197 Prosecutors had subpoenaed the reporters to appear before state or federal
grand juries and testify about whom and what they had seen.198 In each case, prosecu-
tors invoked “the ancient role of the grand jury” to seek “every man’s evidence,” in-
cluding the knowledge of reporters, in the course of inquiring into whether a crime had
been committed.199 The journalists, on the other hand, argued that a privilege rooted
in the First Amendment should be recognized, preventing their “annexation” by law
enforcement and exempting them from compliance with the subpoenas.200 For the
reporters, the issue was ultimately about access to information and “the free flow of
188 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
189 See id. at 665.
190 See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
191 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
192 Id. at 256–64, 283–84.
193 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30–31 (1971); Associated
Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967) (per curiam); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
133–34 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67–68 (1964).
194 See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665–83.
195 See FLOYD ABRAMS, FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT LINES WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 124 (2013).
196 Id.
197 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667–79.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 686, 688.
200 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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information” to the public.201 They argued that confidential sources were crucial to
news reporting, and that, with no constitutional privilege for the press to refrain from
answering a grand jury’s questions, sources would dry up, newsgathering would
stall, and the flow of information on public matters would be seriously curtailed.202
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the reporters’ arguments and
found no such privilege in the Constitution.203 The closeness of the case was under-
scored by the fact that the split among Justices took place at the very center of the
Court; writing for the majority was Justice White, and writing for the dissent was
Justice Stewart, both of whom were considered centrists in the realm of the First
Amendment.204 But the majority opinion could not have been bleaker for the reporters
advocating a constitutional testimonial privilege. Justice White stressed the law en-
forcement backdrop of the case and the nature of the grand jury rule, noting that it was
a generally applicable law in the sense that the public and the press alike were bound
to comply.205 Because the rule did not single out the press, White insisted that First
Amendment scrutiny was not required at all206—although he did acknowledge that
“news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,”207 specifically pro-
tections from prosecutorial harassment and bad-faith criminal investigations.208 Aside
from whether or how much the First Amendment figured in the case, the majority be-
lieved that the rule’s “burden” on the press was empirically uncertain—there was little
evidence that grand jury testimony of this kind had the effect of impeding the flow
of news.209 Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the majority, the case raised
institutional-competence questions of how courts would administer the privilege; White
wrote that he could envision “practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order,”
including the problem of defining who would qualify for the privilege, the problem of
applying the fact-intensive three-prong test proposed by the dissent, and ultimately the
larger worry of embroiling the courts in disputes over which statutes to enforce.210
Justice Stewart’s dissent rejected the majority’s equivocations about the First
Amendment.211 Noting the “societal” interest in maximizing the people’s receipt of
201 Id. at 679–80 (majority opinion).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 667, 708–09.
204 Id. at 667; id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting); cf. ABRAMS, supra note 195, at 157.
205 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682–83.
206 Id. at 690. For a discussion of White’s later use of the same rule in Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), see LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY:
JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V.
SULLIVAN 350–51 (2014).
207 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
208 Id. at 706–08.
209 Id. at 693–94.
210 See id. at 703–06; cf. id. at 713 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 743 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
211 Id. at 725, 727–36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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information, Stewart flatly declared that a “corollary of the right to publish must be
the right to gather news.”212 On this view, newsgathering was part of publication,
and the First Amendment protected the reporter’s newsgathering choices as much
as the publication itself.213 Moreover, confidentiality made possible news accounts
of great social value for an age of “widespread protest and dissent”214—accounts deal-
ing with “sensitive areas involving government officials, financial affairs, political
figures, dissidents, or minority groups that require in-depth, investigative reporting.”215
This discussion amounted to the first clear recognition of the educative effect of a
strong right of access. As if in answer to White’s concern about intruding into the
work of another branch, Stewart suggested that a reporter’s privilege could have the
salutary effect of checking a prosecutor’s “unbridled subpoena power.”216 While
White’s hands-off approach to doctrinal innovation when cause-and-effect of legal
rules was less than certain, Stewart answered that protections for newsgathering and
publication were crucial, and that a qualified privilege would accommodate the in-
terests in a reasonable way.217
In the end, Branzburg was more about questions than answers. The Justices were
clearly divided over characterizing newsgathering. Was it a potentially unaccount-
able “system of informers operated by the press to report on criminal conduct,” as
the majority glumly put it,218 or a “corollary” of speech, as the dissent maintained?219
The Justices differed as well in defining the governmental action in Branzburg and
stating the proper test. Did the “ancient” obligation to appear and testify amount to
a law of general applicability with only an “incidental” impact on expression, thus
reviewable under intermediate scrutiny or perhaps not reviewable at all, as Justice
White stated?220 Or was it a generally applicable law affecting “relationships,” such
as reporter-source, that are “vital to the free flow of information,” and therefore
reviewable under a much more searching standard, as Justice Stewart maintained?221
Finally, the Justices were divided on the question of the judiciary’s competence in
this context, with Justice White taking a wary separation-of-powers approach222 and
Justice Stewart assuming a more aggressive checks-and-balances stance.223 On these
212 Id. at 725–27.
213 Id. at 728.
214 Id. at 729 n.5 (quoting the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Caldwell v. United States, 434
F.2d 1081, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 1970)).
215 Id. at 733.
216 Id. at 732–33.
217 Id. at 733–34, 741–43.
218 Id. at 697 (majority opinion).
219 Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
220 See id. at 682–83, 686–87 (majority opinion).
221 See generally id. at 725–52 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 706 (majority opinion).
223 Id. at 727–28 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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questions, the case showed stark differences of understanding about access and its
appropriate place in First Amendment thought.
And besides access itself, what of the educative concern that Justice Brennan
had addressed in his 1964 speech? On one level, the Branzburg dissent argued that
a privilege would facilitate access to the sort of sources that would yield high-profile
stories involved in the case—stories about undeniably compelling political and cultural
issues.224 The educative effect of such news coverage was clear. But if Brennan had
seen a need to spur “worrying and thinking” about U.S. institutions and the desir-
ability of inculcating constitutional values, then even the coverage in Branzburg
could fall short.225 To make possible the “worrying and thinking” that Brennan had
in mind, it would be necessary to ensure wide access to governmental institutions
themselves—and mainly courts.226 Branzburg had offered only the vague assurance
that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections.”227
Two years later, reporters brought two cases addressing newsgathering issues
that were different from those in Branzburg; in Pell v. Procunier228 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.,229 reporters were beating on the door of the government itself
for information.230 Whereas Branzburg had addressed reporters’ strategies for obtain-
ing facts from private actors in private settings, Pell and Saxbe involved reporters
seeking information that was literally under the lock and key of the government.231
And whereas the reporters in Branzburg had already published the fruits of their
newsgathering and sought protections to ensure future use of sources for reports of
newsworthy information, the reporters in Pell and Saxbe had yet to publish and needed
cooperation from the government itself in order to cover what they wanted to cover.232
The reporters sought access to prisons.233 They wanted to interview inmates, and they
wanted to select the inmates, not leave the selection to the wardens’ discretion.234
224 Id. at 732–33.
225 Cf. supra notes 168–79 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 168–79 and accompanying text.
227 408 U.S. at 707.
228 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
229 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
230 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 820; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844.
231 Compare Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679–80 (discussing reporters’ claims justifying inter-
view confidentiality), with Pell, 417 U.S. at 826 (introducing security concerns for face-to-
face communication with inmates), and Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844 (noting a general prohibition
on press interviews with inmates).
232 Compare Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669–70 (recounting the published news story), with
Pell, 417 U.S. at 819–26 (detailing obstacles and concerns surrounding reports’ face-to-face
communications with inmates), and Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844 (explaining that reporters were
denied permission to interview inmates).
233 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 819–23; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844.
234 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 820–22, 820 n.3; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 848–50.
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In Pell, the California prison bureaucracy rebuffed the requested interviews in
no uncertain terms, citing a state regulation forbidding “[p]ress and other media
interviews with specific individual inmates.”235 California justified the regulation on
security grounds.236 Previous experience with press-initiated interviews had made
“prison celebrities” of selected inmates, and the prison had suffered disruption.237
Arguing that a flat ban was nevertheless too broad a response to the state’s concern,
reporters challenged the regulation as a violation of a First Amendment–based “right
to gather news without governmental interference.”238 The second case, Saxbe, in-
volved a regulation imposing the same ban in federal prisons: “Press representatives
will not be permitted to interview individual inmates.”239
In both instances, the Supreme Court, in 5–4 decisions, upheld the bans.240 The
Court in Pell held that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitu-
tional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.”241
Unfortunately, the Court gave no reasons for using the public’s rights as the consti-
tutional baseline.242 Moreover, it was not clear why that baseline was consistent with
the Constitution when similar reasoning was used in Saxbe.243 Adding to the puzzle
was the fact that Justice Stewart, the advocate for press newsgathering rights in
Branzburg,244 wrote the Pell and Saxbe majority opinions, which were undeniable
setbacks for the press.245 What had happened? The answer is important for what it
reveals about early judicial misgivings about access rights. If Branzburg featured a
defeat of access rights by a venerable institution—the grand jury—Pell and Saxbe
featured hostility to access rights based on reservations about “positive” rights.
For Stewart, it seemed that the right of newsgathering invoked in Branzburg was
a familiar, unexceptionable negative liberty, whereas the right to gather invoked in
the prison cases required action by the government, and so was essentially a positive
liberty.246 Stewart was quite clear that, besides the impracticality of a press right of
235 417 U.S. at 819 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
236 See id. at 831.
237 Id. at 831–32.
238 Id. at 829.
239 417 U.S. at 844 n.1.
240 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 818, 835; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 843, 850.
241 417 U.S. at 833–34 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684–85 (1972));
accord Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
242 See generally, e.g., Pell, 417 U.S. 817.
243 See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“I cannot follow the Court in
concluding that any government restriction on press access to information, so long as it is
nondiscriminatory, falls outside the purview of First Amendment concern.”).
244 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725–26 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
245 See generally Pell, 417 U.S. 817; Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843.
246 Compare Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727–28 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing the
importance of a right to gather news), with Pell, 417 U.S. at 829–32 (juxtaposing the right
to gather news with the need for prison security).
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access to prisons and the seeming lack of a limiting principle if such a right were
recognized, the positive right invoked in Pell and Saxbe was too conceptually prob-
lematic.247 As he wrote in Pell:
It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of
information not available to members of the general public, that he
is entitled to some constitutional protection of the confidentiality
of such sources, and that government cannot restrain the publica-
tion of news emanating from such sources. It is quite another
thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government
the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of in-
formation not available to members of the public generally. That
proposition finds no support in the words of the Constitution or
in any decision of this Court.248
But why was an affirmative duty on the government’s part such a stumbling block?
Justice Stewart’s opinion implied that “affirmative duties” carried the specter
of augmenting, even distorting, the role of courts, thereby disturbing the distribution
of powers among the branches.249 In a famous article from the same period,250 he
characterized the American press as the “Fourth Estate”; in his view, its constitu-
tional role was to check the branches of government.251 This was not a surprising
view (although it meant that he saw the Speech and Press Clauses as having inde-
pendent significance), but Stewart added a twist: that a checking power, such as that
of the press, had definite limits, and that the Constitution allowed politics itself a large
role in resolving interbranch struggles over governance.252 As he wrote, “[s]o far as
the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it knows, and may
seek to learn what it can,” but “[t]he Constitution . . . establishes the contest, not its
resolution.”253 On this view, the press’s checking power extended as far as made
possible by a negative liberty to gather what could be gathered without outright gov-
ernmental intervention and to publish whatever the press decided to publish.254 But
a line was drawn at court-enforceable positive rights of the press; Stewart appeared
247 See, e.g., Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
248 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834–35 (internal citations omitted).
249 See id. There is a slight echo here of Justice White’s separation-of-powers concern in
Branzburg, although Justice White’s worry was about the legislature designing a privilege,
whereas Justice Stewart’s worry was about judicial power to order the executive branch to
provide information to a third party. Compare id., with Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
250 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
251 Id. at 634.
252 See id. at 633–36.
253 Id. at 636.
254 Id. at 635–36.
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to argue that the Court’s approval of a positive right of access would unduly increase
the press’s position in the balance of power.255 Such a right would lead to enforce-
ment by federal courts in the form of orders compelling the executive branch to turn
over information to reporters, with no clear limiting principle.256 This power of the
press would stack the “contest.”
Justice Stewart’s outlook, seemingly shared by a majority of the Justices in the
prison cases,257 echoed an understanding of the Constitution voiced by Judge Posner
in a decision several years later: “[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather
than positive liberties [and that t]he men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not
concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it might do too
much to them.”258 But both Posner and Stewart were forgetting that “positive rights
are a longstanding feature of American legal traditions,”259 at least in the sense that
some cherished negative liberties have been thought to contain limited affirmative
obligations of the government, particularly in circumstances in which such duties are
“indispensable” to the functioning of the negative liberties.260 As Professor Currie
noted, “[f]rom the beginning there have been cases in which the Supreme Court, some-
times very persuasively, has found in negatively phrased provisions constitutional
duties that can in some sense be described as positive.”261
In this light, another reading of the majority opinions in the prison cases is surely
possible—that Justice Stewart had not forgotten that affirmative duties play a limited
role in connection with some negative liberties, but had determined that recognizing
such a duty in Pell and Saxbe, where the press was seeking a right not shared with the
public, and where there was no record showing the workability of such a right, would
be inappropriate.262 In a different setting, with a shared right and a record of usefulness,
255 See id. at 636.
256 See id. at 631, 633–34, 636.
257 See, e.g., Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850 (concluding the Constitution does not provide any
special affirmative duty to provide journalists with information not available to the public).
258 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1049 (1984). Currie, supra note 3, at 864–65, discusses this passage at length.
259 Eugene Volokh, Positive Rights, the Constitution, and Conservatives and Moderate
Libertarians, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 7, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/05/07
/positive-rights-the-constitution-and-conservatives-and-moderate-libertarians/ [https://perma
.cc/D5J7-UUQ3]. Professor Volokh listed examples of positive rights under our Constitution:
“the Contracts Clause, which bars states from impairing the obligation of contracts”; the
Takings Clause, which “bars the government from interfering with my right to exclude others
from my property”; the right of holders of U.S. debt to be paid back under Article VI; the
Seventh Amendment, which “might also be seen as securing a positive right to have lawsuits
that one brings in federal court be decided by a jury,” assuming jurisdiction. Id.
260 See Currie, supra note 3, at 875.
261 Id. at 886.
262 See, e.g., Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850 (citing Pell to establish that the press have no con-
stitutional right beyond the rights of the general public).
2018] THE VISIBILITY VALUE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1021
perhaps the affirmative duty embedded in the negative liberty of speech could make
sense even to Justice Stewart and others in the Pell and Saxbe majorities.
Dissenting in Saxbe, Justice Powell was unconcerned with the nature of the
right—only with its workability.263 Convinced that American prisons had to be more
accountable to the public, and that the press could play a useful role, he sought to
strike a balance between the prison’s interests in security and avoidance of the burden
of case-by-case resolution of access requests, on the one hand, and the public’s in-
terest in monitoring conditions in the country’s prisons, on the other.264 But besides
imagining a workable right of access in a prison setting, Powell commented on what
would be gained from the interviews sought by the reporters: “facts” rather than
rhetoric, and information about “real grievance[s]” rather than stories concocted out
of pressure by fellow inmates.265 Justice Powell was voicing the educative dimension
of access, affirming that “worrying and thinking” about a multitude of prison issues
could constructively take place.266
In a third prison case decided a few years later, Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,267 the
Court again found no First Amendment right of access, this time, to enter and film
portions of a county jail where an inmate had committed suicide.268 The Court split
4–3, with Chief Justice Burger writing the prevailing opinion in favor of the state.269
Again, the Court relied on the fact the press had not been singled out for treatment
other than that afforded to the public.270 In addition, the Chief Justice, echoing Justice
Stewart’s doubts about positive rights, maintained that the Court had no role “in what
is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to the political processes.”271
Burger rejected any notion that freedom of the press could have an affirmative com-
ponent: “Whether the government should open penal institutions in the manner sought
by [the press] is a question of policy which a legislative body might appropriately re-
solve one way or the other.”272 A forceful dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Brennan and Powell, took the opposite position, insisting that “[w]ithout some pro-
tection for the acquisition of information about the operation of public institutions
such as prisons by the public at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by
the Framers would be stripped of its substance.”273 Stevens enlisted the support of
James Madison’s much-quoted statement: “A popular Government, without popular
263 Id. at 858–60 (Powell, J., dissenting).
264 See id. at 872–73.
265 See id. at 855–56, 855 n.6.
266 See id. at 872–74.
267 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion).
268 Id. at 3–4.
269 Id. at 2, 15–16.
270 See id. at 11.
271 Id. at 12.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean
to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives.”274 But neither side of the debate pressed its own analysis very far; the Jus-
tices in Houchins confined their thoughts to the connection between gathering and
publishing without much regard for the next step in the speech dynamic—the con-
nection between publication and its teaching function.275
In the next access case, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,276 the question of positive
rights receded somewhat from the Court’s attention; the press was not seeking access
to an institution that was governed by another branch of government and that had
a long history of closure, but to a judicial branch proceeding—a suppression hearing
in a criminal case—that presented entirely different historical questions of public par-
ticipation.277 The controversy was therefore not about the nature of the right, but about
its source.278 Gannett had based its theory of access on the “public trial” language of
the Sixth Amendment and only secondarily on the First Amendment.279 In a majority
opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right
was personal to the accused and unavailable to the press and public as a basis for
access.280 The Court deferred the question of whether a right of access to a pretrial
suppression hearing could be grounded in the First Amendment.281 In a dissent by
Justice Blackmun, four Justices noted that access to a pretrial suppression hearing
could be an important means of informing the public about issues “beyond their
importance to the outcome of a particular prosecution.”282 Access could illuminate
“police and prosecutorial conduct, and about allegations that those responsible to the
public for the enforcement of laws themselves are breaking it.”283 The dissent thus
touched on, without developing, the idea that values transcending a particular case
could be the subject of education and debate.
In sum, the four cases produced no clear doctrinal path and little theoretical
clarity. The concern about positive rights was more confused than clarifying and
seemed unlikely to assume great importance. As for the basis of an access right, the
Sixth Amendment was ruled out, and the First Amendment’s candidacy was left for
another day. At the same time, the Court had voiced at least some constitutional
274 Id. at 31–32 (quoting Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)).
275 See, e.g., id. at 32 (noting gathering is entitled to some constitutional protection).
276 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
277 Id. at 370–71, 374–79.
278 See id. at 376, 382–93.
279 Id. at 379–80, 391.
280 Id. at 379–80.
281 Id. at 392.
282 Id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
283 Id.
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support for newsgathering protections, and a number of the Justices had recognized
the educative effect that such protections could yield. And the likeliest site for an
access right was the judicial branch itself.
E. Richmond Newspapers: The Clash over a Rationale
Finally in 1980, the Court seized an opportunity to address access comprehen-
sively in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,284 which involved a criminal trial
that a trial judge closed to the press and public, citing a state law that accorded judges
wide discretion to close their courtrooms.285 A newspaper challenging the closure
order argued that the First Amendment entitled the press and public the right to attend
criminal trials.286 In a 7–1 decision, the Court answered the question affirmatively,
with six opinions supporting the judgment and one dissent.287 Despite the number of
opinions, a majority of the Justices recognized a qualified First Amendment–based
right of access to criminal trials,288 accorded little importance to any distinction between
negative and positive liberties,289 and set forth a framework for deciding future access
cases within the judicial branch.290 Forty years after the decision, it may be difficult to
understand why this seemingly straightforward question prompted seven opinions.
Perhaps an effort to reconcile and accommodate the problems encountered in the pre-
vious cases accounts for the Court’s voluminous output in Richmond Newspapers.
The principal clash was within the seven-Justice majority, specifically between
Chief Justice Burger, whose opinion was joined by two others (Justices White and
Stevens), and Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justice Marshall.291 Both Burger
and Brennan agreed on the outcome—that the First Amendment includes a qualified
right of access on the part of the press and public to attend a criminal trial.292 And
both agreed that the correct framework for access questions involved two inquiries:
(1) whether the proceeding in question had a significant history of openness; and
(2) whether openness played a positive role generally in the functioning of the
284 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
285 Id. at 559–60.
286 Id. at 560–63.
287 Id. at 558; id. at 581 (White, J., concurring); id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
584 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 598 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment);
id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 604 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 573–80 (plurality opinion).
289 Cf. id. at 576 (citing Branzburg for the broad proposition that the First Amendment
covers newsgathering, distinguishing Pell and Saxbe as involving institutions lacking a his-
tory of openness, and not addressing the question of positive versus negative liberties).
290 See id. at 564–73 (identifying the history and function framework).
291 Id. at 558; id. at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
292 See id. at 576–77 (plurality opinion); id. at 597–98 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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proceeding.293 It was on the elucidation of this second inquiry that Burger and
Brennan differed.
The Chief Justice wrote that openness had been recognized for centuries as im-
portant “to the proper functioning of a trial.”294 Openness “gave assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned.”295 It also “discouraged perjury,
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.”296 These
practical contributions to positive functioning of criminal trials were well understood.297
Burger added that a related advantage of openness was what John Henry Wigmore
had called its “educative effect”; openness gave citizens “acquaintance” with “the
methods of government” and a consequent “strong confidence in judicial remedies.”298
Not delving deeply into “the methods of government,”299 the Chief Justice’s assump-
tion was that citizens would have the intellectual resources to evaluate trials against
a standard of fairness, and that in all likelihood the trial would pass the test with
flying colors.300 In his own opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Brennan agreed with
much of this, although he provided his own theoretical framework and his own account
of the “methods of government” that a citizen could learn under a rule of openness.301
But before getting to Brennan’s view, it is important to note that Chief Justice
Burger stressed an additional functional advantage of openness: its “therapeutic
value.”302 Here, he appeared to change the topic; no longer discussing tangible ways
in which openness aids the functioning of a trial, he shifted to a description of how
openness aids the functioning of a community by calming it down.303 The Chief
Justice explained that “open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic pur-
pose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion.”304 Simply
by putting the public on notice “that society’s responses to criminal conduct are under-
way,” a rule of openness discourages “natural human reactions of outrage and protest,”
including possible violent retribution.305 The knowledge that trial proceedings will be
open gives members of the public a chance “to restore the imbalance which was
created by the offense,” and may even “satisfy that latent ‘urge to punish.’”306 Burger
293 Id. at 573–74 (plurality opinion); id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
294 Id. at 569 (plurality opinion).
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 See, e.g., id.
298 Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
299 Id. (citation omitted).
300 For a discussion of this thesis, see, for example, Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public
Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 414 (1987).
301 448 U.S. at 585–89 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
302 Id. at 570 (plurality opinion).
303 See id. at 570–71.
304 Id. at 571.
305 Id.
306 Id. (quoting Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Crimi-
nal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1961)).
2018] THE VISIBILITY VALUE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1025
concluded that openness can produce “community catharsis,” even if members of the
community dislike the result and find it “untoward.”307 Openness, then, was ulti-
mately about securing acceptance.
This discussion of therapeutic value was consistent with the Burger’s contem-
poraneous interest in the idea of law’s healing function; in 1982, in remarks to the
American Bar Association (ABA), he stated that “[t]he obligation of our profession
is, or has long been thought to be, to serve as healers of human conflicts.”308 In a talk
the following year, asking “What is the role of lawyers?” he suggested an answer:
“In their highest role, lawyers should be the healers of conflicts and, as such, should
help the diverse parts of a complex, pluralistic social order function with a minimum
of friction.”309 In 1984, he again addressed the ABA, asking, “Should lawyers not be
healers? Healers, not warriors? Healers, not procurers? Healers, not hired guns?”310
With these and similar queries, the Chief Justice became something of a precursor
of the movement for “therapeutic jurisprudence,” which regards law “as a social
force that has considerable impact on people’s emotional lives and psychological
well-being.”311 From this perspective, decisionmakers fashioning legal rules or ex-
amining legal processes and practices are advised to take into account the therapeutic
impact of their work on the behavior of all involved.312 The Chief Justice’s refer-
ences to a “significant community therapeutic value”313 can be seen as his effort to
contribute to the conversation about the nature of access rights. Just as he urged the
legal profession to consider a healing role, and thus to transcend the strictly legal
problem-solving nature of lawyering, his discussion in Richmond Newspapers sug-
gests the relevance of a non-legal factor in recognizing the First Amendment’s im-
plied right of access.314
Some scholars have questioned the Chief Justice’s introduction of therapeutic
considerations to this area of law. Judith Resnik, for example, suggests that since
“much of the style, pace, and manner of a trial seems designed to rein in and to con-
trol emotions,” therefore the possibility of an attendee’s experiencing “psychic
relief” of a cathartic nature is remote.315 In addition, the passage of time between a
potentially criminal event and the resulting trial can be lengthy, reducing the chance
307 Id. at 571–72.
308 Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982).
309 Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Role of the Lawyer Today,
Remarks at the Dedication of Notre Dame London Law Centre (July 29, 1983), in 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (1983).
310 Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 331, 359 (2008).
311 Charity Scott, Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts,
25 J. LEGAL MED. 377, 379 (2004) (reviewing JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003)).
312 See generally id.
313 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980) (plurality opinion).
314 Id. at 570–71.
315 Resnik, supra note 300, at 412–13.
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that a trial could serve as a genuine emotional outlet. Professor Resnik thinks it more
likely that trials provide occasions for “generating potentially powerful narratives”
that can capture the public’s interest and possibly link citizens “across social and eth-
nic boundaries,”316 but there is no guarantee that such narratives are accurate and it is
hard to see how the narrative effect relates to positive functioning of the trial itself.317
The Chief Justice’s comments can be questioned on additional grounds. First,
a focus on catharsis could narrow the reach of Richmond Newspapers. If the Chief
Justice’s meaning was that access was appropriate for proceedings capable of pro-
viding a collective emotional outlet, perhaps the right would not extend to proceed-
ings that generally lack that quality. Therapeutic relief might not be expected, for
example, in pretrial suppression hearings or other preliminary proceedings in which
only one part of a criminal case is on view and in which testimony could add to,
rather than reduce or subdue, the public’s “concern, hostility, and emotion.”318 Would
this possibility counsel against a finding of presumptive access? Another question
concerns what should happen when a criminal trial involves a high risk of negative
emotional impact on a victim or a witness. Should the therapeutic value of openness
outweigh the therapeutic value of closure when a negative impact is feared?
In a 1982 case, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,319 the Chief Justice voted
against a First Amendment requirement of public access to a state rape trial involving
a minor victim.320 Although he did not cite (or distinguish) his comments in Richmond
Newspapers concerning the positive therapeutic value of open trials, Burger, in Globe
Newspaper, made much of the negative psychological effects of access on minor vic-
tims of sex offenses who testify in open court.321 None of the Justices in Globe Newspa-
per commented on how dueling therapeutic arguments should be handled, if at
all—they may have thought that the question was a morass to be avoided.322 In any
event, a legitimate criticism of Burger’s discussion in Richmond Newspapers is that
it presented “therapeutic value” as relevant to the question of access but was silent on
whether it should be a required consideration. In addition, its proponent offered scant
guidance as to how courts should measure such an interest, and did not address how to
proceed if therapeutic concerns appeared on both sides of an access controversy.323
316 See id. at 413–14.
317 Cf. id.
318 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (discussing how public anger occurs regardless
of what stage the criminal proceeding is in).
319 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
320 Id. at 612–20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
321 E.g., id. at 613, 619–20 (“Many will find it difficult to reconcile the concern so often
expressed for the rights of the accused with the callous indifference exhibited today for chil-
dren who, having suffered the trauma of rape or other sexual abuse, are denied the modest
protection the Massachusetts Legislature provided.”).
322 See generally id. at 598–611 (majority opinion); id. at 611 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in judgment); id. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 620–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323 Cf. id. at 612–20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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A second criticism is that in using the “healing” potential of openness as an
element of analysis in Richmond Newspapers, Burger paradoxically may have under-
mined access as a presumptive right. The criticism is not that therapeutic consider-
ations are irrelevant to policy discussion or wrongheaded on psychological grounds,
but that they alter the topic of discussion. Once courts start talking about collective
catharsis as a means of dealing with trauma, and once they give weight to community
psychology, the conversation about access to information is no longer a rights-oriented
one about the legal relationship of citizens to government but is a harm-oriented con-
versation about injured citizens and how to spare them from further harm. The con-
versation becomes “procedural” in the sense of envisaging a process of trauma and
healing. By elevating therapeutic considerations to a primary functional consider-
ation, the Court risks underemphasizing the idea of access as a right.324
Writing for himself and Justice Marshall in Richmond Newspapers, Brennan
said nothing about Burger’s functional arguments for access to a criminal trial.325
Although he steered clear of therapeutic jurisprudence, Brennan’s analysis of func-
tionality began (as did the Chief Justice’s) with the question of “whether access to
a particular government process is important in terms of that very process.”326 His
answer with respect to criminal trials was an unqualified yes.327 He began by noting
that openness furthers the judicial system’s effort “to assure the criminal defendant a
fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence.”328 Because these accepted bene-
fits of openness needed little elaboration, he proceeded to “other, broadly political,
interests” that openness advanced—specifically, interests of structure.329 The first in-
terest was relational: the construction and maintenance of a trust relationship between
the judiciary and the citizen.330 On this view, openness demonstrated “that procedural
rights are respected, and that justice is afforded equally.”331 The second interest was
evaluative. Through no less than fifteen citations to a 1948 due process case, In re
Oliver,332 Brennan stressed that openness, like other constitutional checks, subjects
trials to “contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion,” thereby serving
as “an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”333
The thrust of the concurrence was that constitutional openness contemplates a
certain kind of citizen: one who senses, discerns, and ultimately learns and practices
324 Contra id.
325 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584–98 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment).
326 Id. at 589.
327 See id. at 592–93.
328 Id. at 593.
329 Id. at 594.
330 See id.
331 Id. at 595.
332 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
333 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270).
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political virtue.334 This individual grasps that traditions of democratic respect offer a
promise of protection from arbitrary governance.335 Over time, he or she finds oppor-
tunities to learn about that promise in depth and to experience it personally through
a sustained interplay of participation, attention, and reflection.336 For Brennan, the
assumption of a right to attend a criminal trial was that citizens would form a respon-
sible standard with which to evaluate the content of such proceedings.337 Openness
was not merely a symbolic construct of republican government, but rather a neces-
sary condition for the growth of civic judgment based on ever-deepening knowledge
of and allegiance to legal values.338 And the values he hoped would be part of this
picture were those of due process.339 In a 1988 talk for the Forty-Second Annual
Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Justice Brennan stated that the American notion of
due process underscores “the essential dignity and worth of each individual,” and
specifically guarantees “fairness between the State and the individual dealing with
the state.”340 Perhaps his lifetime focus on dignity—rather than on any psychological
vulnerability of the individual—marked the difference between Justice Brennan and
the Chief Justice in Richmond Newspapers, and perhaps the purpose of access from
Brennan’s perspective was not simply to monitor broadly the fidelity of powerful
institutions to due process norms but to help the citizen internalize those norms and
apply them in some form in life more generally.
Oliver seemed to have been Justice Brennan’s touchstone for due process. With
a majority opinion penned by Justice Black, Oliver held that an individual’s proce-
dural due process rights were violated when a state judge acting as a “one-man grand
jury” charged the individual with contempt of court, convicted him of the crime in
a closed courtroom, and sentenced him to jail.341 The Supreme Court, observing that
“no court in this country has ever before held, so far as we can find, that an accused
can be tried, convicted, and sent to jail, when everybody else is denied entrance to the
court, except the judge and his attaches,” found the secret trial to be a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.342 Black’s opinion traced the his-
tory of open trials, cited Voltaire and other Enlightenment thinkers, and referenced
various authorities on the purposes of access, including the expectation that “spectators
334 See id. at 584–98.
335 See id.
336 See id.; see also, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF GOVERNMENT 22 (1948) (discussing the “town hall,” where citizens can take part in
open government).
337 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 594–96 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
338 See id. at 587, 594.
339 See id. at 590–94.
340 Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 139, at 15 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 609 (1974)).
341 333 U.S. 257, 261, 273 (1948).
342 Id. at 271–73.
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learn about their government and acquire confidence in judicial remedies,”343 and that
they keep the “triers [of an accused] keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility
and to the importance of their functions.”344 Justice Brennan’s plentiful citations to
Oliver in Richmond Newspapers suggest that, in his view of access, the Speech and
Press Clauses of the Constitution serve the Due Process Clauses. Among the “condi-
tions” that access rights make possible is the freedom to examine government proceed-
ings for compliance with procedural justice.345
But what more does it mean for citizens to have that freedom, and to undertake
that responsibility? Brennan’s Cardozo speech advocated that judges and citizens
internalize a combination of reason and empathy in developing and monitoring the
law’s pursuit of procedural justice.346 In his view, “the greatest threat to due process
principles is formal reason severed from the insights of passion,”347 and in his lexicon,
passion meant empathy—the attempt to grasp “the uneven fabric of social life”348
and to give “attention to the concrete human realities at stake” in a given situation.349
Admittedly, these phrases have the ring of abstractions, but in a 1970 case, he had
the opportunity to apply them. In Goldberg v. Kelly,350 discussed in his Cardozo
speech, Brennan faced the question of defining due process for individuals who had
been receiving welfare checks but learned that the government bureaucracy thought
them no longer eligible and removed them from the list of recipients.351 For Brennan
and the Court, the challenge was to recognize the “drastic consequences” faced by
the individuals and to determine, as a Court, “the responsibilities of the bureaucratic
state to its citizens.”352 Practically speaking, the question involved whether a hearing
was required, and if so, at what stage of the process it should take place.353 Brennan
did not claim that he and the Court had reached a perfect outcome in mandating a
pretermination hearing under the Fourteenth Amendment; in fact, he conceded that
the decision “may have even contributed in some ways to the formality of the wel-
fare system.”354 He also thought that questions of due process “admit of no static
solution” and considerations can change over time.355 His conclusion: “Each age must
seek its own way to the unstable balance of those qualities that make us human, and
must contend anew with the questions of power and accountability with which the
343 Id. at 266–70, 269 n.23, 270 n.24 (citation omitted).
344 See id. at 270 n.25 (citation omitted).
345 See, e.g., id. at 270 & n.25 (citation omitted).
346 Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 139, at 16.
347 Id. at 17.
348 Id. at 16.
349 Id. at 20.
350 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
351 See id. at 255–57.
352 Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 139, at 20, 22.
353 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255.
354 Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 139, at 22.
355 Id.
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Constitution is concerned.”356 At the same time, he found value in the fact that de-
cisions like Goldberg “opened a dialogue” about the interaction of bureaucracies
and citizens.357 In allowing his audience to hear his reflections on how the decision
was reached, Brennan signaled the sort of reflection and dialogue that citizen access
to government proceedings would ideally make possible.
F. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s access cases made one basic decision: that speech about
matters of public concern makes a particular contribution to democratic discussion
when it is “informed,”358 and therefore that a right to become informed—to gather
or receive information about a broad range of topics—needs the same constitutional
protection as communication itself.359 The negative liberties of speech and press could
reach their potential only with the aid of positive liberties to gather and receive in-
formation of public concern.360 Justice Brennan’s role was central in articulating an
access right derived from a dynamic constitutional relationship between citizens and
the government.361
The implicit aspiration of Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers
and his majority opinion in Globe Newspaper was that both sides of the citizen-
government relationship benefit from a strong access rule. First, through the citizens’
freedom to witness, inspect, and argue with each other about the concrete workings
of basic values in judicial proceedings, the judiciary’s legitimacy benefits over time,
even if there are instances of failures of justice and difficulties in fashioning rules for
changing conditions.362 Second, as citizens witness, inspect, and argue about trials or
other proceedings, they have the opportunity to increase their knowledge of constitu-
tional values, subject those values to skeptical thought, and develop their republican
character, even if slowly and not always comprehensively or straightforwardly.363
Arriving at the recognition of an access right was no easy task. It involved a
lengthy process of airing issues, eliminating false fears, setting limits, and announc-
ing a workable framework: if certain elements are true about a governmental pro-
ceeding (that it has a history of openness and that openness plays an overall positive
functional role), a presumption of access arises, rebuttable only by a compelling state
interest served by a narrowly tailored means.364 Although the framework sounds clear,
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J,
concurring in judgment).
359 See discussion supra Section I.E.
360 See discussion supra Section I.E.
361 See discussion supra Section I.E.
362 See discussion supra Section I.E.
363 See discussion supra Section I.E.
364 See discussion supra Section I.E.
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it was actually vague from the start. Neither the Chief Justice nor Justice Brennan for-
mulated the history-plus-function framework as a mandate; instead, the Chief Justice
discussed the two considerations as relevant to the question of presumptive openness
in the case before the Court, and Justice Brennan called the two considerations “help-
ful principles” that give “special force” to a case involving access to a criminal trial.365
Even if the history and function inquiries were in fact mandatory, the content of the
first of those inquiries—whether there was a tradition of accessibility—was particu-
larly uncertain. For one thing, the requisite “level of generality” was cloudy: should
a court focus simply on whether the proceeding is a criminal trial, or should the court
inspect the particular segment or aspect of a criminal trial?366 The Supreme Court
also left unanswered the question of “what ‘history’ is relevant”—was it required
that the origins of the proceedings be traceable to early English history, or at least
to early American history, or at least to early twentieth-century American history?367
If there are both positive and negative functional effects, how should a court resolve
the conflict? If a court finds the presumption rebutted, how detailed and explanatory
must a judge’s findings be, and how safe are they from appellate review? Having
left doctrinal elaboration of these and other issues to the lower courts, the Supreme
Court decided no more major access cases after 1993.
II. MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP: CORE VARIABLES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
As traced by scholars,368 appellate courts have produced varying answers to the
doctrinal questions left open by the Supreme Court. This Part does not chronicle those
doctrinal developments, but considers the contributions of appellate courts to access
jurisprudence from another vantage point. In exploring two Third Circuit cases in depth,
one a criminal case,369 the other a civil case,370 this Part proposes an “anatomy” of ap-
pellate reasoning in cases about access.371 As shown below, the “experience and logic”
framework turns out to be a surprisingly supple tool in the hands of careful appellate
judges as they work through difficult cases about access. The cases demonstrate that
365 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569, 573, 589 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). However, courts tend to interpret the two-part frame-
work as a requirement. See, e.g., Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514
(3d Cir. 2013) (stating that “[i]n order to qualify for public access, both experience and logic
must counsel in favor of opening the proceeding to the public”).
366 See, e.g., Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Williams, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment).
367 See, e.g., id. at 1105.
368 See generally, e.g., David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 835 (2017); Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access
Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2006); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991).
369 See United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
370 See Strine, 733 F.3d 510.
371 See discussion infra Sections II.A–C.
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key analytic variables made possible by the framework are analogy, relationship, and
function. In both cases, we see judges differing over the choice of analogies to guide
the inquiry into historical practice; we see them differing over how a particular access
decision may affect the citizens’ trust of courts; and we see them turning to func-
tional considerations mainly to bolster their initial conclusions about the citizen-court
relationship.372 The goal of this Part is to show that, once the Supreme Court made
the essential choice of a First Amendment qualified access right, the appellate courts
found ways to make the framework meaningful, all the while keeping central Justice
Brennan’s original focus.
A. United States v. Simone373
In Simone, decided in 1994, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit exam-
ined whether the First Amendment required access to posttrial inquiries into possible
juror misconduct in a criminal case.374 Federal prosecutors had brought racketeering
and extortion charges against Robert F. Simone, a criminal defense attorney thought
to be associated with organized crime figures.375 After a lengthy trial, which the press
covered in detail, the jury deliberated for nine days and found Simone guilty on five
counts.376 Shortly after the case concluded, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that
one juror regretted the verdict and had said that several jurors disobeyed the trial
judge by reading newspaper accounts of the trial while it was in progress.377 The
convicted defendant moved the court to conduct an examination of the jurors to de-
termine whether they had violated the bench’s instructions.378 The trial judge granted
the motion and scheduled a closed examination of the jurors.379 The Inquirer learned
that the examination was scheduled to take place, showed up at the courthouse, and
moved the court for leave to attend.380 At a brief hearing, the trial judge refused the
newspaper’s request and declined to stay the proceeding pending the newspaper’s
appeal to the appellate court.381 The trial judge then conducted the examination of
jurors in a closed courtroom.382 Soon after, he denied the defendant’s posttrial motions
and released a redacted transcript of the juror examination.383
372 See discussion infra Sections II.A–B.
373 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
374 See id. at 835.
375 See id.
376 See id. at 835–36; Gary Cohn, Judge Queries Jury from Simone Trial, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Mar. 23, 1993, at B1.
377 See Gary Cohn & Julia Cass, Simone Juror Regrets the Verdict; He Says He Caved
Under Pressure, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 17, 1992, at A1.
378 Simone, 14 F.3d at 835.
379 See id.
380 See id.
381 See id. at 835–36.
382 See id.
383 See id. at 835.
2018] THE VISIBILITY VALUE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1033
The Inquirer took its access arguments to the Third Circuit.384 In a split decision,
two judges found that the newspaper had a First Amendment–based right of access
to the post-verdict juror examination.385 A dissenting judge maintained that no such
right applied and that, even if it did, the trial judge’s release of the transcript was suf-
ficient to meet any constitutional requirements.386 The three different approaches in
the case illustrate issues faced by courts seeking to implement the Supreme Court’s
access jurisprudence.
First, in justifying closure, the trial judge, Judge Giles, listed reasons from the
bench, stressing three main considerations: analogy, relationship of citizens to the
court, and function.387 He began by analogizing posttrial juror examinations to mid-
trial juror examinations, noting that precedent permitted trial judges to close the
latter.388 This use of analogy allowed him to take a short-cut: he bypassed an in-
depth application of the “experience and logic” framework, apparently on the theory
that the analysis had already been done for the analogous proceeding and that a prior
court had found closure of that proceeding justified.389 Judge Giles supported his
decision to close the proceeding by opining that the relationship in this instance be-
tween the public and the court was negligible.390 “To the extent that there is an inter-
est at this point in the proceedings,” he stated, “it is the Government’s interest and the
defense interest. The public has no outcome interest.”391 The clear message was that
a citizen-court relationship of the sort Justice Brennan contemplated in Richmond
Newspapers—a relationship that benefits the court by securing public confidence in
its workings, and that benefits citizens by educating them as to legal values of proce-
dural justice—simply did not exist in the setting of a posttrial examination of jurors.392
On this view, the relationship that had existed during pretrial proceedings and had con-
tinued during the trial itself had reduced to nothing once the verdict was rendered—
no matter what the posttrial juror examination would reveal. Thus, the public interest
was not a factor for consideration.
Finally, Judge Giles stated that even if there were a “public interest” in the sense
of a presumptive right of access, functional considerations dictated closure.393 Any pre-
sumptive access right in this setting was “far outweighed by the need of the Court and
384 Id.
385 Id. at 834–35, 840.
386 Id. at 847 (Garth, J., dissenting).
387 Transcript of Hearing on Press Motion to Intervene at 4–6, 8–10, United States v.
Simone, No. CR 91-569, 1993 WL 106478 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1993) (copy on file with the
author). The transcript of the short hearing in Judge Giles’s courtroom on whether to open
the post-verdict voir dire is appended to the brief for the media appellants.
388 Id. at 5.
389 See id.
390 See id.
391 Id.
392 See id.
393 Id. at 8.
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the interest of justice to conduct a hearing in the least coercive atmosphere.”394 The
judge’s explanation, then, was that the case was outside the Richmond Newspapers
framework, but that even if a presumptive access right existed, it was outweighed
by a functional interest in emptying out the courtroom—particularly the press—to
ensure juror candor and due process for the criminal defendant.395
Writing the majority opinion for the panel that reversed the trial judge’s deci-
sion,396 Judge Roth had far different views on these points, but emphasized the same
variables—analogy, relationship, and function.397 She flatly rejected the analogy that
likened posttrial juror examinations to those that take place during the trial.398 The
two were not remotely similar, in her thinking, because the mid-trial proceeding con-
cerned a deliberative body in the midst of hearing a case, whereas the posttrial pro-
ceeding concerned former jurors who had completed deliberations and had rendered
a verdict.399 In the former, access by the press and public would quite likely impede
the functioning of the jury and the jurors’ deliberative role, whereas in the latter, ac-
cess simply could not have the same negative effects.400 Thus, the relationship between
courts and citizens strongly favored a presumptive right of access to a post-verdict
proceeding that inquired into possible juror misconduct.401 Moreover, access would
enhance the functioning of the process itself by promoting “informed discussion of
governmental affairs,” facilitating greater “understanding of the judicial system,”
discouraging perjury, and allowing the testing of the jury system’s integrity.402
Having found a presumptive right of access, Judge Roth asked whether the right
was outweighed by an “overriding interest” justifying closure.403 The answer was
no.404 The trial judge had been concerned about two things: (1) that the presence of
the press would be detrimental to the truthfulness of the ex-jurors, and (2) that the
ex-jurors might “inadvertently reveal information concerning the jury’s deliberative
processes.”405 Judge Roth thought that the first concern was deficient, amounting to
a “generic concern” for veracity that “proved too much in that it could be used in favor
of almost any limitation on access.”406 And the second concern was easily managed,
Judge Roth wrote, by admonitions to the jurors during the posttrial voir dire.407 More
394 Id.
395 See id. at 4–6, 8–10.
396 United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
397 See id. at 835.
398 Id. at 839–40.
399 Id.
400 See id.
401 Id. at 840.
402 Id. at 839 (citations omitted).
403 Id. at 840 (citations omitted).
404 Id. at 840–42.
405 Id. at 841.
406 Id.
407 See id.
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importantly, in rejecting the trial court’s fears that the presence of the press would
be “coercive” in affecting the ex-jurors’ veracity, Judge Roth underscored the lack
of evidence for those fears, implying that a trial judge should close only after pro-
actively developing a record specifically supporting such a decision.408 Thus, in his
efforts to protect the jurors and the rights of the defendant, the trial judge in Simone
had completely ignored the court’s relationship with the public.409
Judge Garth’s dissent, that the trial judge’s timely release of a transcript of the
closed posttrial examination satisfied the demands of the First Amendment, provided
a third perspective.410 Using the same variables as his fellow judges, Garth wrote that
the most persuasive analogy was between the posttrial examination of jurors, on the
one hand, and “evidentiary rulings made during sidebars or chamber conferences,” on
the other.411 For the latter circumstances, even the Brennan concurrence in Richmond
Newspapers had suggested limitations on the reach of the First Amendment.412 More-
over, Garth thought that First Amendment access rights diminished after a criminal
verdict had been reached, because “no issue of innocence or guilt is hanging in the
balance.”413 The idea, apparently, was that the court-citizen relationship became less
dependent on transparency after completion of a trial, although the reason for this was
hardly clear in the context of allegations of juror misconduct.414 Garth also disparaged
the court-citizen relationship when he wrote that press complaints about the insuf-
ficiency of “cold transcripts” were “lame,” and when he suggested that in posttrial
settings, the media’s “zeal” might center on “a desire for human-interest accounts of
deliberative proceedings as ends in themselves, written to sell papers.”415
Simone, then, illustrates the kinds of arguments made in access cases, particu-
larly the functionalist reasoning of an appellate panel in implementing Richmond
Newspapers. The Brennan emphasis on public participation and the educative effect
permeates the majority opinion, with its close attention to the inadequacies of the
trial court’s analogy, its emphasis on the strength of the presumption of openness, and
its doctrinal instruction to trial courts on the importance of making records.416 The
dissent resists the Brennan solicitude for public participation.417 In isolation, each
of the dissent’s arguments has merit, but its skepticism about the benefits of open-
ness goes against the grain of Richmond Newspapers.
408 See id.
409 See id. at 840–41.
410 Id. at 842–43 (Garth, J., dissenting).
411 Id. at 845.
412 See 448 U.S. 555, 598 n.23 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (addressing
interchanges at the bench, although not specifying the subject matter).
413 Simone, 14 F.3d at 843 (Garth, J., dissenting).
414 See id. at 846–47.
415 Id. at 844, 846 (citation omitted).
416 See id. at 835–42 (majority opinion).
417 See generally id. at 842–47 (Garth, J., dissenting).
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B. Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine418
In a much-noted 2013 case, the question of constitutional access involved a
statute authorizing state-sponsored arbitration in Delaware.419 With the goal of keeping
Delaware attractive to businesses deciding where to incorporate, the Delaware leg-
islature enacted a law that created a confidential, closed adjudicatory procedure for
speedy, highly professional arbitration of corporate disputes.420 The statute authorized
the judges of Delaware’s Chancery Court to arbitrate disputes involving an amount-
in-controversy of no less than one million dollars.421 At least one of the parties had
to be a “‘business entity formed or organized’ under Delaware law,” and no party
could be a “consumer.”422 The statute permitted judges to “grant any remedy or relief
that [s/he] deems just and equitable and within the scope of any applicable agree-
ment of the parties,” with review in the Delaware Supreme Court under the “defer-
ential standard outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act.”423 Most importantly for our
purposes, the statute barred attendance by any member of the public, all “materials
and communications” in the arbitration process were confidential, and the proceed-
ings were to be kept off “the public docketing system.”424 Documents and petitions re-
mained confidential on appeal unless the Delaware Supreme Court provided otherwise
in its Rules.425 The case arose when a public interest group challenged the statute on
First Amendment grounds.426 A split panel of the Third Circuit agreed that the statute
unconstitutionally barred the public from attending the judge-adjudicated arbitrations.427
As in Simone, the case featured separate opinions, each illustrating a key aspect of
litigation in First Amendment access cases.428
The trial judge in Strine, Judge McLaughlin, found the statute unconstitutional.429
Like the judges in Simone, she proceeded by focusing on the variables of analogy,
relationship, and function—and analogy provided the key inquiry.430 In Publicker
Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,431 decided in 1984, a panel of the Third Circuit recognized
civil trials as presumptively open to press and public under the “experience and logic”
418 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).
419 Id. at 512.
420 Id. at 512–13.
421 Id. at 512.
422 Id. (citation omitted).
423 Id. at 513 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
424 Id. (citation omitted).
425 See id.
426 Id. at 512.
427 Id. at 512, 521.
428 See id. at 512–21; id. at 521–23 (Fuentes, J., concurring); id. at 523–26 (Roth, J.,
dissenting). See generally United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
429 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012) (mem.).
430 See generally id.
431 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
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framework.432 Judge McLaughlin chose to see the question in Strine as whether the
Delaware arbitration scheme so resembled a civil trial that Publicker applied, with
openness presumptively required.433 This approach allowed the Judge to skip the
“experience and logic” analysis aimed specifically at state-sponsored arbitration.434
Of course, skipping the “experience and logic” analysis meant that the Judge could
avoid dealing with the fact that state-sponsored arbitration lacked a long history of
openness and might not qualify for a presumption of openness.435 The focus on anal-
ogy, then, allowed the Judge to bring to bear a more functional, rather than historical,
consideration of a novel proceeding, at the same time tying the court’s consideration
to precedent.436
Having framed the issue as a question of analogy, the Judge compared the func-
tioning of civil trials to the functioning of the arbitration scheme, and decided that
the resemblance was compelling.437 As she put it, “the parties submit their dispute
to a sitting judge acting pursuant to state authority, paid by the state, and using state
personnel and facilities; the judge finds facts, applies the relevant law, determines
the obligations of the parties, and the judge then issues an enforceable order.”438 The
conclusion was that the “procedure is sufficiently like a civil trial that Publicker
Industries governs.”439
But the Judge emphasized more than analogy; she also emphasized the court-
citizen relationship, the fact that the relationship depends on public confidence achiev-
able in part by judicial transparency, and the promise that openness will facilitate not
only civic awareness of how judicial institutions operate but also informed debate
about how institutions should operate.440 She affirmed the teaching of Publicker that
openness of civil proceedings can produce the same positive functional benefits as-
sociated with openness of criminal trials.441 Judge McLaughlin then went further in
delineating the public nature of judging and how that task relates to access.442 She
stressed that judicial power itself derives from “appointment to a public office” and
service to the public, and that “the actions of those charged with administering
justice through the judiciary is always a public matter.”443 Although these sentences
432 Id. at 1068, 1071.
433 Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 500–04.
434 See id. at 503–04 (engaging in a minimal analysis of “experience and logic” following
thorough analysis of the civil trial analogy).
435 See id. (using an analysis rendering an experience and logic framework moot).
436 See id. at 502–04.
437 Id. at 502 (determining that “[t]he Delaware proceeding, although bearing the label
arbitration, is essentially a civil trial”).
438 Id. at 503.
439 Id.
440 See id. at 498–99.
441 Id. at 498.
442 Id. at 501–02.
443 Id. at 498, 501.
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were written as if simply describing civil courts, they were surely making a norma-
tive point—that only civil judges can awkwardly wear the two hats assigned to them
by the Delaware statute.444 “A judge bears a special responsibility to serve the public
interest,” she wrote.445 “That obligation, and the public role of that job, is under-
mined when a judge acts as an arbitrator bound only by the parties’ agreement.”446
Summarizing her constitutional, functional, and precedential reflections, she con-
cluded that “the judiciary as a whole is strengthened by the public knowledge that
its courthouses are open and judicial officers are not adjudicating in secret.”447
The appellate panel in Strine affirmed Judge McLaughlin’s result—although not
her methodology.448 Writing for the majority, Judge Sloviter stated that the trial judge
had erred in foregoing the “experience and logic” analysis required by Richmond
Newspapers.449 According to the court, Supreme Court precedent permitted avoidance
of that analysis only if the challenged proceeding were “identical” to a proceeding that
had already been analyzed under the “experience and logic” framework.450 In the
panel’s view, “[a]lthough Delaware’s arbitration proceeding shares a number of fea-
tures with a civil trial, the two are not so identical as to fit within the narrow exception”
created by precedent.451
Thus, the majority opinion fully engaged the “experience and logic” framework.452
On its face, the court’s reason for this approach was unexceptionable. The relevant
precedent does seem to prefer the panel’s approach, although it is by no means explic-
itly required.453 But, aside from guarding the panel’s opinion from any appealable
error on this issue, it may be that the majority found the “experience and logic”
framework not only more “appropriate” under precedent, but also more conducive
to a thorough and persuasive ventilation of the issues than even Judge McLaughlin’s
remarkable blend of considerations. Judge Sloviter’s opinion for the panel recog-
nized and made use of the fact that both “experience” and “logic” essentially call for
functionalist analysis, and that more, not less, of this kind of analysis was necessary
in a case involving a novel proceeding backed by strong policy justifications, not to
mention strong political forces within the state.454
Addressing the “experience” prong, the majority decided to forego the trial
court’s question of analogy and to look more broadly at the “type” of proceeding at
444 See id. at 501–04.
445 Id. at 502.
446 Id.
447 Id. at 504.
448 See generally Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).
449 Id. at 515.
450 Id.
451 Id. (discussing El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993) (per curiam)).
452 See id. at 515–21.
453 See generally El Vocero, 508 U.S. 147.
454 See generally Strine, 733 F.3d 510.
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issue.455 This “broad historical approach” consisted of tracing the history of openness
of the “place and process” of both proceedings that the Delaware scheme seemed to
resemble: civil trials and arbitrations.456 Because the history of a proceeding includes
the history of reasons for its longevity, the court’s analysis included much detail about
the rise of civil trials and arbitrations and the role of access.457 The court unsurpris-
ingly found a centuries-long history of access to civil trials and noted that “[t]he
courthouse, courtroom, and trial remain essential to the way the public conceives of and
interacts with the judicial system.”458 As for arbitrations, there was an early (fifteenth
century) history of openness, a sparse record in the American colonies and, thereafter,
and a twentieth century record of “distinctly private” proceedings adjudicated by paid
professional arbitrators in private venues, due to the preference for non-adversarial
and confidential resolution for matters of a “private nature.”459 The court’s presenta-
tion of these histories—of proceedings, personnel, locations, and justifications—led
to its conclusion that “[p]roceedings in front of judges in courthouses have been
presumptively open to the public for centuries.”460
Analysis of the “logic” prong included consideration of both positive and
negative impacts of openness on the Delaware proceeding. Again, the framework
invited more functional reflection than Judge McLaughlin’s focus on analogy to
civil trials. The panel enumerated the same benefits of openness mentioned by Judge
McLaughlin—benefits springing from the court-citizen relationship and the value
it places on informed discussion and public perception of fairness.461 But the court
added an additional benefit of openness that underscored a concern about the non-
egalitarian thrust of the statute: “Opening the proceedings would also allay the public’s
concerns about a process only accessible to litigants in business disputes who are
able to afford the expense of arbitration.”462 The court’s choice of the “experience
and logic” framework, cumbersome as it might be, also made possible this sort of
frank observation about how access could serve the public good.463 In effect, the
“logic prong” reminded the court of the visibility value of the First Amendment—
the freedom to witness and discuss potential incursions on norms of equality and
other social values.464
The court then turned to Delaware’s arguments about the negative impacts of
access and answered each one—to rather devastating effect. Here, the court was able
455 See id. at 515–16.
456 Id. at 515–16, 518.
457 Id. at 515–18.
458 Id. at 516.
459 Id. at 517–18.
460 Id. at 518.
461 See id. at 519.
462 Id.
463 See id. at 518–19.
464 See id.
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to catalogue the state’s chief defenses of the statute and either question them or let their
weaknesses speak for themselves.465 Thus, the state’s concern that openness would
compromise trade secrets or other closely held information was easily answered,
said the court, by the availability of protective orders and other devices commonly
used in civil cases.466 A second concern—that “loss of prestige and goodwill” could
result from press coverage of the arbitrated business disputes—was deemed irrele-
vant, with the court stating that these effects “would not hinder the functioning of the
proceeding nor impair the public good.”467 The court deflected a third concern—that
“privacy encourages a ‘less hostile, more conciliatory approach’”—by citing works
suggesting that arbitrations themselves can be quite contentious and that collegial
arbitrations are usually due to informality of rules rather than to privacy.468 A final
official concern was that openness would defeat the state’s interest in attracting busi-
nesses to Delaware.469 The court rejected the argument out of hand, first by declaring
that the First Amendment would forbid a law that was intended to create a “secret
civil trial,”470 and then by noting other features of the statute that could still attract
businesses to the state.471 The court also resurrected the equality issue by questioning
the state’s interest in a statute that was not available to “businesspersons with less than
a million dollars in dispute.”472 And the court raised a final point: that the state’s
interest included not simply attracting businesses to Delaware but also allowing public
vigilance over “proceedings [that] derive a great deal of legitimacy and authority”
from the use of state judges and state courtrooms.473 The thrust of the opinion was
that the positive contributions of access derived from the citizen-court relationship
deserved great weight, and that the impacts proffered by the state as negative—
particularly the alleged detriment to the state’s corporate climate—were compara-
tively weak.474
Judge Roth dissented, and her opinion arguably echoed Judge Giles’s trial-level
opinion in Simone, where he had discerned no public interest in the post-verdict
proceeding and hence no role for public access.475 In a similar way, Judge Roth’s
dissent stressed that “a judge serving as an arbitrator derives her authority from the
465 See id. at 519–20.
466 See id. at 519.
467 Id. (citation omitted).
468 Id. at 519–20 (citation omitted).
469 See id. at 520.
470 Id.
471 See id. at 520 & n.3.
472 Id. at 520.
473 Id.
474 See id. at 515–21 (outlining the court’s reasoning).
475 Compare id. at 523–26 (Roth, J., dissenting), with United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d
833, 843 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) (Garth, J., dissenting) (providing excerpts from Judge Giles’
district court decision).
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consent of the parties,” rather than “from the coercive power of the state.”476 From
this premise, it was not hard to conclude that the Chancery Court judges presiding in
state-sponsored arbitration were outside their constitutional relationship to the people
and therefore that public access had no role to play. Applying the “experience and
logic” framework nonetheless, the dissent rejected Judge McLaughlin’s focus on anal-
ogy and the majority’s approach of looking broadly at the “type” of proceeding.477 The
dissent confined its examination to private arbitrations, with no attention at all to fea-
tures shared with civil trials.478 The dissent concluded that arbitrations had historically
been private, and that public access could play no positive role in the process.479
C. Conclusion
In the wake of the Supreme Court decisions recognizing a right of access to
criminal trials and various components of those trials, the appellate courts took up the
role of applying and elaborating the Court’s “experience and logic” framework.480
Simone and Strine illustrate the range of proceedings in which access issues can
arise.481 The cases also demonstrate how appellate judges in different contexts articu-
late the court-citizen relationship that drove recognition of access rights in the first
place, and how panels address issues of analogy and function. These three consider-
ations enable judges to take into account the Constitution’s vision of popular sover-
eignty, the role of precedent, and the practical effects of public disclosure in widely
differing settings in an open society.
Simone and Strine demonstrate that functional analysis is the heart of the access
right and that the citizen-court relationship is its soul. Analogy also figures promi-
nently but requires persuasive justification to carry the day. The trial judge’s under-
explained use of analogy in Simone led to reversal; although a mid-trial voir dire
might resemble a posttrial voir dire in part, the similarities were simply not strong
enough for the Court of Appeals.482 In Strine, the trial judge’s use of analogy ran into
a different problem on appeal; although an arbitration might resemble a civil trial,
the trial judge’s use of the analogy in place of the “experience and logic” framework
limited the number of functional considerations that the trial judge could discuss.483
Finally, these cases show how appellate panels contribute to access doctrine.
Simone and Strine strongly suggested a proactive role for trial courts in developing
substantial records on functional questions. In each case, the panel’s use of the
476 Strine, 733 F.3d at 525 n.4 (Roth, J., dissenting).
477 Id. at 525–26.
478 Id.
479 Id.
480 See discussion supra Sections II.A–B.
481 See discussion supra Sections II.A–B.
482 See generally United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
483 See Strine, 733 F.3d at 514–15.
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“experience and logic” framework demonstrated the dominance of functional analysis,
and how comprehensive the “experience and logic” framework allows—and even
invites—that analysis to be. In this way, both panels “managed” the court-citizen
relationship set in motion years before, particularly by Justice Brennan.
III. SAFEGUARDING THE RELATIONSHIP: VIGILANCE OF TRIAL JUDGES
If the Supreme Court’s role was to announce a philosophy of access, and if the
appellate courts’ mission has been to translate that philosophy into workable doc-
trine and to demand careful, functionalist reasoning, a distinctive additional role has
been played by trial judges in implementing the right to access. In recent cases, three
judges breathed life into the court-citizen relationship by raising access questions
in circumstances where neither of the opposing parties seemed to care that an access
question was implicated.484 As suggested by a recent book on challenges faced by
trial judges, these solitary decisionmakers often express a sense of closeness to their
communities, feel a duty to explain their decisions to the public in understandable
terms, and compose opinions out of a desire to inform and educate.485 A similar com-
mitment to the teaching function of openness clearly motivated the jurists described
in this Part: Judge Michael Urbanski, presiding in wrongful death litigation between
a victim’s family and a product manufacturer in a federal courthouse in southwest
Virginia; Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock, hearing a contract dispute between two
powerful media corporations in Delaware’s Court of Chancery; and Judge John
Gleeson, encountering a deferred criminal prosecution in the Eastern District of New
York.486 In each situation, the access philosophy of Justice Brennan and the doctrinal
contributions of appellate panels were aided and abetted by a trial judge’s stubborn
commitment to the educative benefits of visibility.487
Brennan’s writings again shed light on the judicial mind. At the Columbia Law
School Bicentennial Celebration in 1987, he delivered a speech on the federal judi-
ciary as chief protector of constitutional rights, Brennan stated that a “meaningful
implementation” of U.S. rights would have three hallmarks: stability, in the sense of
“resistance to abrogation”; enforceability, in the sense of capacity to force compliance;
and adaptability, in the sense of flexibility in responding intelligently to changing
circumstances.488 As shown in this Part, Judge Urbanski bolstered stability of the
484 See discussion infra Sections III.A–C.
485 See generally JOEL COHEN, BLINDFOLDS OFF: JUDGES ON HOW THEY DECIDE (2014)
(surveying several prominent judges on how they decided complex cases).
486 See discussion infra Sections III.A–C.
487 See discussion infra Sections III.A–C.
488 Brennan, Worldwide Influence, supra note 93, at 4–7. For a challenging critique of
adaptability in the sense of supporting a “living Constitution,” see generally J. HARVIE
WILKINSON, III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012).
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access right in rejecting its almost casual abuse;489 Vice Chancellor Glasscock de-
manded its enforceability in refusing to let two parties essentially litigate in private;490
and Judge Gleeson demonstrated its adaptability in applying Richmond Newspapers
in a new context.491 Their actions took place in a period when notorious closure orders
by other trial judges had attracted significant attention, such as the decision of the
trial judge in Doe v. Public Citizen492 to close an entire civil case out of outsized def-
erence to a statute that seemingly protected manufacturers from internet criticism,493
and the decision of the judge in United States v. Blankenship494 to impose an across-
the-board gag on virtually anyone495 involved with the criminal prosecution of a power-
ful mine owner in West Virginia. Both orders were overturned by the Fourth Circuit,496
but they signaled the pressures on trial judges to close access in high-profile cases.
A. Jain v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.497
When a well-known public radio host died unexpectedly in a Virginia hospital
following hernia surgery, his daughters explored options to sue.498 A potential claim
against the hospital was for negligent programming of a pain pump and negligent
monitoring of its use in the care of the decedent.499 A second possible claim was
against the pump’s manufacturers, Abbott Laboratories and Hospira, Inc., for defec-
tive instructions.500 When the hospital settled with the family in state court, the family
brought suit against the manufacturing defendants in federal court.501 After a year of
procedural battles before Judge Urbanski in the Western District of Virginia, those
defendants and the family chose to settle.502
489 See generally Jain v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 7:13-cv-00551, 2014 WL 7330805 (W.D.
Va. Feb. 24, 2015) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
490 Al Jazeera Am., LLC v. AT & T Servs., Inc., No. 8823-VCG, 2013 WL 5614284, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2013).
491 See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (JG), 2016 WL 347670,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016) (finding that Corporate Monitor’s Report is a judicial record
and the public has a First Amendment right of access to the Report).
492 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014).
493 Id. at 252–55 (providing a brief summary of the proceedings at the trial court level).
494 79 F. Supp. 3d 613 (S.D.W. Va. 2015).
495 See generally id.
496 In re The Wall Street Journal, 601 F. App’x 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2015) (overturning
Blankenship, 79 F. Supp. 3d 613); Public Citizen, 749 F.3d at 253.
497 No. 7:13-cv-00551, 2014 WL 7330805 (W.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2015).
498 See Jeff Sturgeon, Seth Williamson’s Daughters Collect $500,000 in Lawsuit Settlement,
ROANOKE TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.roanoke.com/news/seth-williamson-s-daughters
-collect-in-lawsuit-settlement/article_67963890-f61b-5ff4-845e-5d6179bcbeb5.html [https://
perma.cc/SM6Q-MZE7].
499 See id.
500 See id.
501 See id.
502 See id.; see also Laurence Hammack, Lawsuit Moves Forward in Roanoke Broadcaster
Seth Williamson’s Death, ROANOKE TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.roanoke.com/news
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Abbott and Hospira wanted terms of the settlement to be confidential, specifically
their pledge to “conduct a review, to be directed by a Vice President–level medical
official within Hospira,” of the adequacy of instructions and warnings accompany-
ing the pain pump.503 The agreement required that this investigation include review
of the dozens of reported incidents of deficient programming of the pump—incidents
that the family had gleaned from “adverse event reports and related complaint files”
obtained in discovery, each designated by number.504 It is probable that Hospira and
Abbott wanted to keep the public from learning about repeated incidents involving
their highly touted pump and the companies’ apparent slowness to fix or sufficiently
warn about the product. The companies also pledged in the agreement to review the
opinion of one of the family’s experts, a human factors engineer who had specific
criticisms about the pump’s warnings and instructions.505 These terms, explicitly laid
out in the confidential settlement, made clear that the family sought not simply fi-
nancial compensation but also a promise that the companies would take a hard look
at their product and make changes to preserve the lives of future patients.506 The
family secured these results by agreeing to confidentiality of the settlement.507
The desire for an off-the-record settlement led the parties to a fateful next step.
Section 8.01-55 of the Virginia Code provides that settlement of wrongful death
cases must have “the approval of the court in which the action was brought, or if an
action has not been brought, with the consent of any circuit court.”508 The statute
also states that a petition for court approval “shall state the compromise, its terms
and the reason therefor.”509 Despite the clarity of these provisions, Abbott’s attorney
apparently thought it would be acceptable under the Code to seek approval—and
sealing—of the settlement not from Judge Urbanski, in whose courtroom the case
had been filed, but from a state court judge who had approved the earlier settlement
between the family and the hospital.510 The plan was questionable at best: the state
judge had had no prior connection to the federal case.511 Perhaps the lawyers for
Abbott and Hospira thought that their chances of keeping the terms confidential
/virginia/lawsuit-moves-forward-in-roanoke-broadcaster-seth-williamson-s-death/article
_a2533125-9d03-5a7e-b42b-f61c229fb39a.html [https://perma.cc/9NDH-7UWK].
503 See Confidential Release of All Claims at 8, Jain v. Abbott Labs., No. 7:13-cv-00551, 2014
WL 7330805 (W.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2015) (copy on file with author); Sturgeon, supra note 498.
504 Confidential Release of All Claims, supra note 503, at 8.
505 Id.; Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition of Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’
Expert Kenneth R. Laughery, Ph.D. at 7, Jain, No. 7:13-cv-00551.
506 See Sturgeon, supra note 498.
507 See generally Confidential Release of All Claims, supra note 503.
508 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-55 (2018).
509 Id. See generally Perreault v. Free Lance-Star, 666 S.E.2d 352 (Va. 2008) (interpreting
Section 8.01-50 of the Virginia Code).
510 See Order, supra note 25, at 1–2.
511 See id.
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were greater if they sought approval of the settlement in state, rather than federal,
court. And indeed, a judge of the state court in Patrick County approved the settle-
ment and its sealing, apparently without asking any questions about where the action
had actually been filed, and without weighing the parties’ sealing request against a
presumption of access recognized by the Supreme Court of Virginia in 2008.512
Having achieved secrecy of the settlement, the parties returned to the federal
courtroom to seek dismissal of the suit, only to find a chagrined Judge Urbanski.513
In his pointed exchange with the parties, we see a trial court’s vivid concern for
informing the public and guarding the reputation of the court: “You’re telling me
that the settlement in this case has already been approved by a [state] circuit court
judge?” he asked.514 “You did it under seal so the public doesn’t know about this
case? . . . I’m appalled by what is going on.”515 He continued:
I just don’t see how you can hide this settlement by running down
to Patrick County. You filed it in federal court, you’ve got to
deal with it according to the rules that apply to open court . . . .
I think there’s a strong public interest in these matters, and I
don’t see how you can avoid the public interest associated with
this case . . . .516
When Abbott’s attorney defended the parties’ actions with his interpretation of Section
8.01-55, the Judge responded, “Your reading of that statute is nonsense.”517 He refused
to grant the dismissal without having been petitioned to approve the settlement.518
The Judge made his points in open court but also in a written decision.519 He relied
on precedent authorizing judges to refuse a voluntary dismissal when it was necessary
“to avoid short-circuiting the judicial process, or to safeguard interests of persons
entitled to the court’s special protection.”520 This “safeguarding” role hearkened back
to Justice Brennan’s concept of the citizen-court relationship. Judge Urbanski essen-
tially allowed the public interest to re-enter the case—after the parties themselves had
disregarded it and after the Patrick County court had given it short shrift.521 Invoking
“inherent power,” the Judge took back control, spelling out the wisdom of assigning
512 See id. See generally Perreault, 666 S.E.2d 352.
513 Peter Vieth, Judge Blasts Lawyers for Attempt to Seal Settlement, VA. LAW. WKLY.,
Jan. 29, 2015, 2015 WLNR 39722342.
514 Id.
515 Id.
516 Id.
517 Id.
518 Id.; Order, supra note 25, at 2–4.
519 See generally Order, supra note 25, at 2–4.
520 Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
521 See id. at 1–4.
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settlement approval to the court in which a case had actually been filed.522 “[T]his
court understands what this case is about,” he wrote, signaling that the public would
learn from the exercise of the court’s evaluative role.523 The educative function of
access was thus central to his thought. The judge then addressed “why the parties
have taken this course of action,” and bluntly stated that the parties had sought “to
make an end run around the court” in order to keep the public ignorant.524 Citing
nearly contemporaneous Fourth Circuit precedent, the Judge noted “[t]he right of
public access springs from the First Amendment and the common-law tradition that
court proceedings are open to public scrutiny.”525 The ultimate effect of the decision
was to tell the truth and clean house, thereby increasing what Justice Brennan had
called the access right’s “stability.”526 The right had been treated as flimsy, discre-
tionary, and unimportant, until the court quite powerfully said otherwise. The parties
were ordered to “bring a settlement to [the judge] or pick a trial date.”527
But once the settlement issue was before Judge Urbanski, the parties moved for
permanent redaction of the provisions requiring the companies to investigate the
past complaints and incidents involving the pump.528 Openness versus closure was
still the debate. The companies phrased the argument not in terms of bad publicity
but in commercial terms: competitors could gain an edge, they claimed, from infor-
mation in the settlement.529 Finding no merit in the argument, the Judge reiterated,
“This is a public court. This is public business. . . . Unless there are unusual circum-
stances, [the settlement] should be public.”530 It was indeed made public. Continuous
media coverage led to a final step in the saga: the family’s first settlement—with the
hospital—was made public by the hospital itself.531 How much of this would have
happened without a vigilant court concerned for “stability” of the access right?
The Judge’s primary objective in Jain was to follow the law of access and thus
make the settlement public. The educative effect was to add to the facts that the
public already had and to shed light on the larger dynamics of marketplace behavior
and personal injury litigation. But the public learned even more than that. When the
parties sought to hide the settlement in another court, a key concern was to hold the
522 Id. at 2–3.
523 See id. at 3.
524 Id. at 3 & n.2.
525 Id. at 3 n.2 (citation omitted).
526 Brennan, Worldwide Influence, supra note 93, at 4.
527 Peter Vieth, Pain Pump Case Mediated, Maker Will Pay $900K, VA. LAW. WKLY.,
Feb. 24, 2015, 2015 WLNR 39721689 [hereinafter Vieth, Pain Pump].
528 See Peter Vieth, Lawyers Continue to Seek Sealed Settlement in Death Case, VA. LAW.
WKLY., Feb. 3, 2015, 2015 WLNR 39721745 [hereinafter Vieth, Lawyers Continue].
529 See id.
530 Vieth, Pain Pump, supra note 527.
531 Peter Vieth, Hospital Paid $1M to Settle in Death of Broadcaster, VA. LAW. WKLY.,
Mar. 18, 2015, 2015 WLNR 39718820.
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parties to the requirements of the Virginia Code.532 Judge Urbanski allowed the public
to see two things: that he was doing his job (and thus respecting the court’s relation-
ship with the citizens), and that litigants in his courtroom would not be allowed to
“end run” the law. The case allowed the public to see how settlement is an accepted
component of due process and also that the access rules are not self-executing: it
sometimes takes a judge to prop open the doors himself, usher the parties inside, and
signal to the public what is happening and why.
B. Al Jazeera v. AT & T
In 2013, a contractual dispute between two high-profile corporations led to a law-
suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery,533 but news media eager to cover the case
had no idea what the suit was about.534 Both parties to the suit—plaintiff Al Jazeera
America, LLC, a programming network owned by the Al Jazeera Media Network,
and defendant AT & T Services, Inc., the American telecommunications giant and
distributor of cable television to subscribers—had redacted large amounts of infor-
mation from their respective public pleadings, prompting news reporters to intervene
and object under Rule 5.1(f) of the Court of Chancery.535 The news reporters com-
plained that the parties’ redactions completely shrouded the nature of the dispute, pre-
venting the press and public from knowing the facts and issues the Court had been
asked to adjudicate.536
Few saw the lawsuit coming. With ambitious plans to enter the U.S. communi-
cations market, Al Jazeera had hoped to reach 48 million households through its
partnership with AT & T’s U-Verse TV service.537 However, in the summer of 2013,
shortly before the launch of Al Jazeera America, AT & T backed out of their agree-
ment.538 Al Jazeera responded by suing for breach of contract, seeking declaratory
relief, specific performance, and damages.539 Its complaint, however, redacted infor-
mation about “the nature of the dispute and information about the parties’ contrac-
tual relationship, including the terms of the [agreement] underlying th[e] dispute and
the parties’ dealings under th[e] agreement.”540 And AT & T’s answer redacted infor-
mation about such things as the parties’ negotiations, discussion of terms, payment
532 See, e.g., Vieth, Lawyers Continue, supra note 528.
533 Al Jazeera Am., LLC v. AT & T Servs., Inc., No. 8823-VCG, 2013 WL 5614284 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 14, 2013).
534 See id. at *1.
535 Id. at *1–2.
536 Id. at *1.
537 See Brian Stelter, Al Jazeera Makes Limited American Debut, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2013), https://nyti.ms/2GlPJMz.
538 Id.
539 Al Jazeera, 2013 WL 5614284, at *2.
540 Id.
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obligations, pricing, subscribers, and “other commercially sensitive provisions.”541
News organizations and reporters invoked Rule 5.1, which permits “any person [to]
challenge the Confidential Treatment of a Confidential Filing.”542 They argued that
the parties’ redactions violated the Rule’s premise that “most information presented
to the Court should be made available to the public.”543 In addition, they insisted that
the parties failed to carry their burden of showing that “the public interest in access
to Court proceedings” was outweighed by a “harm that public disclosure of sensi-
tive, non-public information would cause.”544
The case came before Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III, who explained Rule
5.1(f) in terms of the court-citizen relationship.545 The Rule had taken effect a few
months before, replacing one that had permitted “too much information [to be]
deemed confidential” and had distorted the public’s understanding of the Court’s
cases.546 In contrast, Rule 5.1(f) was designed to “clarify—and narrow—the informa-
tion deemed confidential,” and thus strengthen “the public’s right of access to court
documents.”547 Explaining this history, the Vice Chancellor cited precedent tracing
the Rule to its roots in the First Amendment and common law.548 He stressed the
understanding of access as “fundamental to a democratic state and necessary in the
long run so that the public can judge the product of the courts in a given case.”549
This view, of course, assumed two things: (1) that access makes it possible to acquire
the knowledge and judgment needed to evaluate, even in part, what government does;
and (2) that access provides the occasions for putting such knowledge and judgment
to work—in the evaluation of claims, arguments, cases, issues, outcomes, and in the
exchange of ideas about these things in dialogue and debate.550
But the Al Jazeera case posed a difficult question: how far did Rule 5.1 go?
Certainly it contemplated that some information could be kept confidential,551 but
what kind and how much? Vice Chancellor Glasscock was quick to say that trade
secrets, price terms, other sensitive proprietary or financial information, and per-
sonal information such as medical records could be guarded under the Rule.552 But
541 Id. (citation omitted).
542 Id. at *1, *3 (citation omitted).
543 See id. at *3 (emphasis removed) (citation omitted).
544 See id. at *1, *3 (citation omitted).
545 Id. at *3.
546 Id. at *1, *3.
547 Id. at *3.
548 See id. at *3 & n.29 (citing Court of Chancery precedent in Horres v. Chick-fil-A, Inc.,
No. 5530-VCL, 2013 WL 1223605, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2013), that describes Rule 5.1
as reflecting the Court’s “commitment” to the First Amendment and common-law “principles”
of access).
549 Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
550 Cf. id.
551 Cf. id. at *3–4.
552 Id.
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Al Jazeera and AT & T were making an argument for more sweeping rights under the
Rule: that information about the very “nature of the dispute” between them should
be kept confidential as well.553 Their point was that such disclosure could have the
same economic impact as the disclosure of price terms.554 As justification, they
described the telecommunications industries as particularly susceptible to losses or
gains caused by the smallest of marketplace rumors or tips.555 Moreover, arguing
that it was almost impossible for a new network to obtain carriage, Al Jazeera said that
details of carriage agreements or disputes could be gravely compromising.556 Mean-
while, AT & T stressed that leaks about the terms it had negotiated with one network
would easily disrupt its deals with others.557 Building on these claims, both parties
argued that substantial sealing of the pleadings was required under Rule 5.1.558
The Vice Chancellor rejected the argument.559 The heart of his approach was his
sense of responsibility, not simply for the public’s interest in open processes, but for
the public’s need to understand the substantive issues in cases coming before the
court.560 In his view, the necessity of basic knowledge about the nature of the dispute
outweighed “the economic harm to the parties that disclosure may cause.”561 For the
Vice Chancellor, the lawsuit at its core involved “the ‘circumstances under which
a journalistic enterprise can be denied entry to the American broadcast market by
a provider with millions of viewers.’”562 This is what the case was about, yet the
parties had deliberately and systematically erased the “circumstances”563 from public
view. The court balked: if information about the central question in a filed case could
be redacted from the pleadings, the matter essentially would be placed beyond pub-
lic understanding—and its adjudication would more clearly resemble a “private
arbitration,” regardless of venue.564 The Vice Chancellor drove his point home by
concluding that parties seeking “the benefits of litigating in a public court” must
shoulder “accompanying responsibilities,” including a duty to make their disputes
comprehensible to the public, even if doing so results in economic harm.565
The Vice Chancellor’s concern ultimately was that the parties had disregarded a
core truth about litigation in the U.S.—that the battle between opposing parties was
not private in nature at all but had a public dimension that could not be so blithely
553 Id. at *5.
554 Id.
555 See id. at *4 & n.32.
556 Id. at *4.
557 Id.
558 See id.
559 Id. at *5.
560 See id.
561 Id.
562 Id. (citation omitted).
563 Id. (citation omitted).
564 Id.
565 Id. at *7.
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swept aside.566 Protecting their own economic positions, the parties had shrugged off
the idea of “public justice”; they had ignored that a contract suit like their own was not
defined by its adversarial structure but had a larger, political, even cultural, dimension
that the trial judge had a duty to preserve.567 By pruning away the essential argu-
ments and issues of the case, the parties had made it impossible for a news story to
be written, a television viewer to form an opinion, a social scientist to take note, or
a political argument to burst out.568 The parties treated their case as private property,
as if the work of a public institution was of no interest to citizens, and the ideas of
the dispute were of no concern to the culture.569
The Vice Chancellor’s accomplishment was to bolster Justice Brennan’s con-
cern for “enforceability” of rights, here the right of access.570 Enforceability entailed
the interpretation of a rule, the creation of a doctrinal framework, and the unflinch-
ing application of the doctrine to a matter in which neither party wanted it applied.571
Enforceability also entailed the clear expression of a background policy—in this case,
that private law is often “public law in disguise,”572 and that the business of courts
includes making it possible for citizens to grasp a controversy, even think it through,
or ask what its larger significance might be.573 Why did the deal between the mam-
moth American distributor and the burgeoning offshoot of a Qatar-based programmer
come undone at the last minute? Only if the access right is enforceable might the
answer slowly emerge.
C. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
In late 2012, after a four-year investigation, Loretta Lynch, then U.S. Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York, announced that the government had filed an
Information bringing “criminal charges against HSBC, one of the largest financial
institutions in the world.”574 The government alleged violations of the Bank Secrecy
Act, including “willfully failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering . . .
program,” and violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and
the Trading with the Enemy Act, including “facilitating financial transactions on be-
half of sanctioned entities” in Iran, Libya, Sudan, Burma, and Cuba.575 On the same
566 See id.
567 See id.
568 See id. at *1, *3, *5, *7.
569 See id. at *7.
570 Brennan, Worldwide Influence, supra note 93, at 5–6.
571 See id.; see also, e.g., Al Jazeera, 2013 WL 5614284, at *1.
572 Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1959) (arguing
that the public is interested in every lawsuit, even suits between private parties).
573 See id.
574 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *1,
*5 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
575 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (JG), 2016 WL 347670, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016); HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *9.
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day, Lynch wrote to Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District, asking him to hold
the case in abeyance for five years pursuant to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(DPA) and a Corporate Compliance Monitor agreement between the Bank and the
government.576 The DPA required HSBC to forfeit $1.2 billion to the U.S., agree to
a stipulated statement of facts detailing its misconduct, cooperate fully with the gov-
ernment, set up substantial remedial measures, and retain an independent compli-
ance monitor who would produce periodic reports.577 “[I]f after five years,” stated
the DPA, “HSBC has complied with the terms and provisions of the DPA, the gov-
ernment will seek to dismiss the Information with prejudice; if not, the government
may prosecute HSBC ‘for any federal criminal violation of which [the government]
has knowledge.’”578
In her announcement, Lynch stated: “Today’s historic agreement, which im-
poses the largest penalty in any [Bank Secrecy Act] prosecution to date, makes it
clear that all corporate citizens, no matter how large, must be held accountable for
their actions.”579 A different view of the plan, however, soon emerged. One U.S.
Senator complained: “The Department has not prosecuted a single employee of
HSBC—no executives, no directors, no [anti-money laundering] compliance staff
members, no one. By allowing these individuals to walk away without any real pun-
ishment, the Department [of Justice] is declaring that crime actually does pay.”580
Judge Gleeson invited the U.S. and HSBC to comment on whether he should ap-
prove the DPA pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A) and U.S.
Sentencing Guideline Section 6B1.2.581 While the parties argued that the Judge’s
authority respecting the DPA was limited, the Judge’s reading of the law was that
“the Court’s authority in this setting is not nearly as cabined as the parties contend
it is.”582 In a decision invoking the court’s supervisory power over criminal cases,
the Judge approved the DPA and noted—reluctantly, it seemed—that the Court’s
role could not end there.583 “[F]or whatever reason or reasons, the contracting parties
have chosen to implicate the Court in their resolution of this matter,” he wrote.584 “By
placing a criminal matter on the docket of a federal court,” he continued, “the parties
have subjected their DPA to the legitimate exercise of that court’s authority.”585 He
stressed that “[t]he parties have asked the Court to lend . . . a judicial imprimatur to
576 See HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 347670, at *1.
577 HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6, *10–11.
578 HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 34670, at *1 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see
also Henning, supra note 65.
579 HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5 n.8 (citation omitted).
580 Brief for Amicus Curiae Professor Brandon L. Garrett in Support of Appellee at 7, United
States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-308) (citation omitted).
581 HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *1.
582 Id. at *5.
583 Id. at *11.
584 Id. at *5.
585 Id.
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the DPA, by arranging for its implementation within the confines of a pending case.
The Court will therefore exercise its supervisory authority over the DPA.”586 Like
Judge Urbanski and Vice Chancellor Glasscock, Judge Gleeson found himself on
novel terrain, sought to measure his legal authority, and found that he had a duty that
he had not asked for but was obliged to meet.587 Federal law enforcement had chosen
a certain strategy for dealing with HSBC and had assumed that it could use the good
offices of the court, at the same time indicating that the court’s oversight should be
minimal.588 But at least with respect to Judge Gleeson, the prosecution miscalcu-
lated, forgetting that by involving the court, it was involving an institution that had
a complex bond with the public—a bond expressed in substantial part by the access
right.589 Stating bluntly that “a pending federal criminal case is not window dressing”
and that the court is not “a potted plant.”590 Judge Gleeson signaled his awareness
that judicial oversight, even if limited, would not likely be welcomed by the prose-
cution or Bank.591
For our purposes, the key legal moment occurred after HSBC’s first year under
the DPA. The corporate compliance monitor, former prosecutor Mike Cherkasky, is-
sued a First Annual Follow-Up Review Report, detailing HSBC’s performance on the
measures that the U.S. had laid out.592 Judge Gleeson ordered the government to file
the Report with the court, and the government complied, filing it under seal.593 Later,
Judge Gleeson received a letter from a member of the public who had a mortgage-
related complaint against HSBC and asked Judge Gleeson about the findings of the
Report.594 When the Judge interpreted the letter as a motion to unseal the Report, the
access issue was joined: Did the public have a right under the First Amendment to
see the monitor’s Report?595
The threshold question was whether the report amounted to a “judicial document,”
and both the U.S. and the Bank insisted that it did not.596 Second Circuit case law de-
fined “judicial document” as a document that is “relevant to the performance of the
judicial function and useful in the judicial process.”597 The government argued that
586 Id. at *6.
587 Id. at *6–7.
588 See id. at *3–5.
589 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (JG), 2016 WL 347670, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016).
590 HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5.
591 See id.
592 HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 347670, at *2; see also Brett Wolf, U.S. Justice Depart-
ment Chooses Former Prosecutor to Be HSBC Compliance Monitor, REUTERS (June 6,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2013/06/06/u-s-justice-department
-chooses-former-prosecutor-to-be-hsbc-compliance-monitor/ [https://perma.cc/E5U6-QLU2].
593 HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 347670, at *2.
594 Id.
595 Id.
596 See id. at *1–7.
597 Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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Mr. Cherkasky’s Report had nothing to do with the court’s appropriate function—
approving the DPA—because the Report had not existed when that approval took
place.598 And, because the court lacked any power over Mr. Cherkasky, the Report
could have no bearing on judicial function.599 Judge Gleeson, however, rejected these
arguments as misreading the duties of the court and impeding the court’s proper role,
thereby damaging the court’s credibility with the public.600 He related the Report to
his duty to supervise the DPA’s implementation over its protected five-year span.601
As he saw it, his job was to “oversee the unfolding of the criminal case that the gov-
ernment chose to file in my court.”602 This oversight required inspection of the Report.
If, for example, the Report disclosed that the Bank had continued to engage in crim-
inal behavior, “it would demean th[e] institution” of the court if the government did
nothing and the court simply stood by.603 In addition, the court had a clearly marked,
if limited, role in each possible scenario under the DPA: if the prosecution deter-
mined that the bank had breached the agreement and commenced a criminal adjudi-
cation, the court would preside in the case; alternatively, if the prosecution decided to
dismiss the charges at the end of the five-year term, the court had a statutory duty to
decide whether to grant leave to dismiss under Rule 48.604 The thrust of the Judge’s
analysis was that the Report was a tool for his supervisory role, even though the role
would be small. As such, the Report was a judicial document.605
The next question was whether the public had a First Amendment right to see
it.606 As expected, the “experience and logic” framework applied, and the “experience”
prong predictably involved a clash of analogies.607 Was the Report more like a docu-
ment supporting a charging decision (and hence “typically non-public”), or was it
more like a document supporting a plea agreement or summary judgment (and hence
typically “public” because it related to a proceeding that substituted for a public
trial)?608 Ultimately, Judge Gleeson relied on the latter analogy—that the DPA was
better viewed as a substitute for a trial, like summary judgment, and that the histori-
cal “experience” supporting openness of documents related to summary judgment
strongly suggested the propriety of openness of DPA-related documents, such as the
Report.609 Turning next to the “logic” prong, Judge Gleeson emphasized that the
HSBC case involved “public institutions” and “matters of great public concern” which
598 Id. at *3.
599 Id.
600 See id. at *3–4.
601 Id.
602 Id. at *3.
603 Id.
604 Id.
605 Id. at *4.
606 Id.
607 Id.
608 See id.
609 Id.
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“the public has an interest in overseeing.”610 The conduct and oversight of “one of
the worlds’ largest banking and financial services organizations” gave the monitor’s
Report special significance.611 Even more important were two other factors: first, that
openness of the Report would alert the public to the “progress of the arrangement
between DOJ and HSBC that the government chose to make the centerpiece of a fed-
eral criminal case,” and second, that openness of the Report would assist the public
in discerning whether (in the Judge’s words) “I am doing my job of monitoring the
execution and implementation of that arrangement.”612 Armed with functional ratio-
nales, Judge Gleeson concluded that the Report was presumptively open.613 Although
the countervailing arguments of the U.S. and HSBC led the Judge to agree to certain
redactions, the Report was otherwise deemed accessible to the public.614
Judge Gleeson’s opinion was notable for three main reasons. First, it extolled
access as a tool for the public to evaluate his own performance as supervisor of the
DPA; in effect he said the Report should be open so that the people can know whether
HSBC is making progress and whether I am being an effective player in this process.615
As such, the case hearkens back to Richmond Newspapers, where the Supreme Court
recognized a right of the public to monitor courts—not some other branch or institu-
tion—in criminal cases.616 The Justices viewed access as serving multiple purposes,
including the strengthening of the bond between the judiciary and the citizen, and
more broadly, familiarizing citizens with judicial values, their workings, their virtues
and infirmities, with the goal of a stronger civic culture.617
Second, the court recognized the value of shining a light on the executive branch
and law enforcement; the implicit theme of Judge Gleeson’s opinion was that the public
had a serious interest in being informed about the “arrangement” made by federal
prosecutors with targeted corporations.618 To be sure, access to the monitor’s Report
would allow review of Judge Gleeson’s own oversight of the DPA, but just as cru-
cially it would spotlight the workings of a major decision of the Department of
Justice to defer prosecution of a worldwide firm of the size and power of HSBC.619
Access could bring the public into a little-known world of prosecutorial choices and
devices to attack corporate criminality.
A third reason relates to the “adaptability” factor of Justice Brennan’s concept
of meaningful rights implementation.620 Justice Brennan defined adaptability as
610 Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
611 Id. (citation omitted).
612 Id.
613 Id. at *5–7.
614 Id.
615 See id.
616 See generally 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
617 See generally id.
618 HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 347670, at *5.
619 See id.
620 See Brennan, Worldwide Influence, supra note 93, at 4–8.
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“flexibility in the face of changing times,” and he was referring to the Constitution’s
deliberate “choice of general language” in fashioning principles “for the illimitable
future.”621 Those words may strike us today as prosaic, but perhaps they too are
“adaptable.” If he were writing today, Brennan might have defined adaptability with
greater precision: as the capacity of a right to fit conditions that are new and unfa-
miliar, or to fit conditions that are familiar but whose meaning is now understood
in a new way, based on changes in culture or context. As Brennan’s successor on the
Court, Justice David Souter, would state: “Meaning comes from the capacity to see
what is not in some simple, objective sense there on the printed page.”622 In the
HSBC case, the access question arose in the context of a relatively new device, the
DPA; the remedial measures to be adopted by the company over the five-year period
were extraordinary in scope; and the roles of government players in the process were
unforged and controversial.623 Was the access right adaptable to this setting? Although
a tradition of openness was unavailable due to the newness of the proceeding, and
analogies were at best imperfect, Judge Gleeson could rely on two strong consider-
ations: the functional benefits of public awareness in ensuring accountability during
the five-year deferral period, and the practical benefits of partial redaction.624 Part of
the appeal of Judge Gleeson’s decision was the sensible meaning he attributed to the
facts of the case: that the court’s oversight role allowed for useful checking of both
bank and prosecution—all within the eye and informed commentary of the public.
But the HSBC saga did not end there. As this Article neared completion, a panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Judge Gleeson, finding
an abuse of discretion in his order unsealing the Report.625 Holding that the Report
was not a judicial document and thus was not presumptively subject to disclosure
under the First Amendment, the panel concluded that Judge Gleeson had miscon-
ceived the district court’s supervisory role in the DPA context.626 That court’s inher-
ent supervisory power, the panel explained, should be considered “extraordinary” and
not simply limited but “extremely limited,” typically implicated only after a defendant
requests judicial intervention based on a claim of prosecutorial abuse or executive
misconduct.627 The mere possibility that a district court might be asked to intervene
on such grounds in the course of a five-year DPA was considered speculative and
621 Id. at 7.
622 David H. Souter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Harvard Commencement
Remarks, in HARV. GAZETTE (May 27, 2010), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010
/05/text-of-justice-david-souters-speech/ [https://perma.cc/EFF4-39H2].
623 See generally HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 347670; United States v. HSBC Bank USA,
N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
624 See HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 347670, at *2–6.
625 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2017).
626 Id. at 128–29.
627 Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
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thus insufficient to establish the relevance of the Report to any supervisory power
claimed by Judge Gleeson.628
The panel’s opinion reversing Judge Gleeson arguably faltered in distinguishing
two prior cases in which panels of the same court had not required a specific request
or present need for judicial intervention in order for documents to be termed judicial
records, but had found relevance in needs that could arise later.629 In addition, the
panel in HSBC did not address how specific requests for intervention could arise if the
likeliest source of such information—the Report—were sealed from the public’s eye.630
The panel went on to discredit Judge Gleeson’s reliance on the Speedy Trial Act’s
provision for district court approval of agreements to defer prosecution, and denied
that the district court’s potential role under Rule 48 furnished present supervisory
authority.631 In light of all these limitations, Judge Gleeson’s decision that the Report
was judicial in nature amounted to a separation of powers violation: an infringement
of the prosecution’s federal constitutional authority “to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.’”632 But in reaching that conclusion, the HSBC panel omitted any
statement of a particular separation of powers test and therefore offered no discussion
of how the limited judicial authority claimed by Judge Gleeson, as further narrowed
by his redactions, could actually result in a constitutional violation.633
Concurring in the panel’s opinion, Judge Pooler wrote separately to underscore
that the case raised important policy questions about DPAs.634 They “allow[] the pros-
ecution to act as prosecutor, jury, and judge,” she wrote, “enforc[ing] legal theories
without such theories ever being tested in a court proceeding.”635 While the use of
DPAs was “neither improper nor undesirable,” added Pooler, “the law governing
628 See id.
629 See United States v. Erie County, 763 F.3d 235, 240 (2d Cir. 2014) (reasoning that
consultants’ reports filed pursuant to settlement agreement were judicial records because they
“would be considered by the Court” in ruling on enforcement motions that might be brought
by “either of the parties,” and “could form the basis” for the court’s reinstating civil pro-
ceedings “if the Court believes that the substance of [a] stipulated order of dismissal is not
being fulfilled”); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that
progress report of court officer appointed pursuant to consent decree was a judicial document,
and that the report “certainly would be germane in assessing” any possible application for
assistance made by the court officer to the court, and that in any party’s possible request for
enforcement of or relief from the consent decree, the “record to be considered surely would
include” matters in the report). The panel in HSBC found these cases distinguishable, stating
that in both instances the district court’s responsibilities were immediate and were contem-
plated by the consent decree or settlement. HSBC Bank USA, 863 F.3d at 139–41. The
distinctions drawn by the court are weak at best. Cf. id.
630 See generally HSBC Bank USA, 863 F.3d 125.
631 Id. at 137–42.
632 Id. at 128–29 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
633 See id.
634 Id. at 142–44 (Pooler, J., concurring).
635 Id. at 143.
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DPAs” permits prosecutors to “exercise[ ] the core judicial functions of adjudicating
guilt and imposing sentence with no meaningful oversight from the courts.”636 Thus,
while the majority characterized Judge Gleeson’s decision as a trespass into executive
power, the concurrence implied that a DPA could amount to a separation of powers
problem in usurping judicial power.
Most importantly, neither the majority nor concurrence addressed Judge Gleeson’s
central concerns: the need to preserve the integrity of the court in the eyes of the
public, and the duty to permit the public itself to monitor the bank’s five-year period
of obligation and change.637 A crucial opportunity for citizens to watch and learn from
public values in action was sadly lost.
CONCLUSION
A three-tiered structure tells the story of the right of access under the First
Amendment.
At the top, the Supreme Court early on identified a philosophy of public access
to major workings of courts, thus facilitating self-governance, connecting citizens to
the courts, and allowing “the people” to understand and evaluate legal values, espe-
cially the priorities associated with due process.
In the middle tier, appellate courts have converted philosophy into flexible doc-
trine, with the result that legal analysis in access cases usually centers on a choice of
analogies and practical assessment of how institutions operate under public scrutiny.
Finally, trial judges on the low rung have contributed high value, making public
oversight possible and public education an often unseen benefit. In three cases of
particular note, solitary judges resisted end runs by lawyers, rejected redactions of core
meaning by powerful litigants, and balked when federal prosecutors sought their im-
primaturs but neglected their bonds to the community. These cases exemplify the on-
going challenges to access at ground zero and illustrate the visibility value’s ultimate
reliance on the public—or, as Justice Brennan might say, the people.
636 Id.
637 See generally id. at 142–44; id. at 128–42 (majority opinion); United States v. HSBC
Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763 (JG), 2016 WL 347670, at *2–5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016).
